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PREFACE

This re search was conducted during the summer of 1971 in
Charleston, Illinois.

The Cl,)mions used to test the validity of the hy-

. pothesis were gathered from samples drawn from the faculty at Eastern
Illinois University and from the elected county officials in Coles County.
Briefly, this study sought to uncover the relationship between levels of
education and specific foreign policy dispositions.

Statistical methods

facilitated the analysis of the large quantity of data.
The demonstration that a given hypothesis may or may not be
valid seems only a small part of the learning process associated with
a study of this type.

Interviewing, and later just talking with forty

county officials was similar to concurrent seminars in local government,
American public opinion, the sociology of small groups, and political
behavior stripped of all euphemisms.

Experiences with the faculty

group both confirmed and denied previously held impressions.
course, a myriad of such impressions was gained eventually.
them are reflected in the data and analysis.

Of
Some of

Many, because of their

judgmental, intuitive, or non-quantifiable nature are not appropriate to
this study.
An appreciation and understanding of the complexities and probii

lems of survey research and quantitative analysis is not the least of the
realizations from this sort of study.

The judgment, rigor, and atten-

tion to detail at each stage of the work determines the confidence with
which the final results may be announced.
This study directly involved over one hundred people including
respondents, interviewers, faculty advisors, programmers, typists,
and just friends who performed various chores from scoring to proofreading.

Any researcher dealing with this many people is impressed

with the near impossibility of coordinating their efforts and relying on
their performances.

At the same time, their ability to cooperate, adapt

to the new and changing, and persist to the completion of a task is often
uncanny.

Little of this is especially new or unusual, but it is reward-

ing to experience.

Charles R • Burns
Eastern Illinois University

1971
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Specific foreign policy issues change from year to year and from
one administration to another.

While the specific issues change, how-

ever, the general areas into which issues cluster remain the same.
Despite the many differences between the Korean conflict and the war in
VJet Nam, for instance, public debate on the two issues has been concerned with the extent to which each issue reflects United States' interests, its willingness to become involved in foreign affairs, and the use
of military force as an instrument of foreign policy implementation.
In the course of the rise and decline of United States invovlement in
Viet Nam, public debate on this immediate issue became particularly
intense.
In a representative democracy, public debate and its substantive
content is especially important.

Leaders and decision makers must

understand the content, sources, and direction of public opinion.

Elec-

ted officials may be voted out of office if they fail to understand the
character .of the opinions which they attempt to lead, ch~nge, or shape.
With this in mind, this study proposes to explain two specific
l

2

attitudes and their sources.

When operationalized, these attitudes are

expressed as two distinct foreign affairs dispositions.

The sources of

the dispositions are the subject of the hypotheses and propositions advanced in this study.
This research is an analysis of hypotheses and related propositions by means of the collection and quantitative analysis of survey data.
The attention of this paper is confined to the role of demographic variables in determining dispositions toward foreign affairs.

Although two

elite groups are examined, they are distinctly "public" elites as opposed
to policy or decision-making elites in foreign affairs.
The two dispositions measured are nationalism-internationalism,
and militarism-pacificism.

The proposed determinants of the disposi-

tions include the level of information of a respondent and several demographic variables, the primary of which is level of education.

The

demographic information is obtained by asking direct questions, but the
dispositions are assessed by means of indirect scales.

The two groups

are local intellectual and political elites, but in drawing a sample from
.the elites, one assumes that the members of the sample possess attitudinal, dispositiona 1, and demographic characteristics similar to the
universe of elites of which they are a part.

In doing political science re search, one might justifiably feel
uncomfortable at the presentatio.n of a project which does not involve a
direct analysis of power, so central is this concept to politics and polit-

3

ical science.

It is beyond the scope of .this work either to catalogue an

extensive list of definitions of power or to develop and defend an orig-·
inal definition.

The extent to which this work is concerned with power

is admittedly limited, and at that, only indirect. 1
To some degree, however, power involves the influence of one
actor or set of actors over another.

The persistence and effectivene-ss

of this influence is governed by many factors, not the least of which are
the perceptions and attitudes of individuals and groups.

At the receiving

end, the more power an individual perceives another to have, the more
likely; ·it is that the recipient will be influenced by the other •. Perception
of actuality, which is molded by attitudinal and situational factors, may
direct human behavior just as surely as what appears as actuality to the
so-called "objective observer".

Otto Klineberg has proposed that

"If, .

as there is good reason to believe . . • , the expectation· of war may in
itself be a cause ·of war, the conviction that it is inevitable may have
important practical consequences. 11 2
Perception, in turn, is governed by a number of factors.

Atti-

tudes, circumstances, and time all interact to increase the. likelihood of
a particular perception.

Chapter II is a selective consideration of the

works of authors who have attempted to account for the factors which
1See, for example, Harold D. Lasswell and Abi:aham Kaplan,
Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950) for a
theoretical discussion of political power •
.2 0tto Klineberg, The Human Dimension In International Relations (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 9.
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govern attitudes and political perceptions, as well as a review of the
techniques they have employed to measure both the determinant factors
and the re sultan~ perceptions.

These studies are especially valuable

for the methodological suggestions and for the hypotheses they provide.

Chapter III develops · the major hypotheses examined in this work
from the studies reviewed in Chapter II.
positions are advanced,

Also,

a number of related pro-

The terminology of the hypothesis and_p.roposi-

tions is explained by means of both theoretical and operational definitions.

In addition, a number of other terms that frequently appear in

this study a.re defined.

The operational definitions, of course, are only

·applicable to those concepts for which measuring instruments ar~ developed.

An understanding of the operational definitions is especially im-

portant for accurate appraisal of the data analysis.
Chapter IV provides the theoretical basis for this study.
ber of concepts and their interrelationships are examined.

A num-

At this level .

of generalization, we approach what has been termed "middle-range"
theory. 3 Higher levels of generalization are not appropriate to the hypothesis being considered and not warranted by the scope of the study.
Given hypotheses and evidence under consideration, more general theory
would border on speculation.
Chapter V is a detailed description of the test used to examine
the validity of the hypotheses.

In most ways, the methodology reflects

3 See David E. Easton, ed., Varieties of Political Theory (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), for a discussion
of the range of theories in polit~cal science.

5

standard procedure among the practitioners of quantitative analysis and
survey technique in political science.

The purpose in using quantative

methods, aside from enabling the researcher to manage large amounts
of information effectively, should be to permit the analysis and simplification of results and the development of conclusions.

Because their

use is intended to inform rather than confuse, similar scales and statistics are employed throughout the test.

Hppefully, this lends consistency

that aids in the interpretation of results.

Because a large measure of

the effort involved in this study was directed at the design and administration of the test, it represents a.major· section of the work.

Appendix

A includes samples of the testing materials described in this chapter.
Chapter VI analyzes the results of the tests in view of the hypothesis and propositions advanced in Chapter III.

The analysis is ~elective

in that the variables in the hypotheses are examined most carefully,
along with variables that were not expected to yield significant relation-·
ships.

Additional variables which are neither directly related to a hy-

pothesis, nor result in unexpected relationships are treated only briefly.·
The results are analyzed according to each independent variable, both
groups being considered.

The analysis of the variables is preceded by

a general description of each group and the characteristics of the aggregate (the results of combining the two groups).

Supplementary tables

and information regarding the data are included in Appendix B.
Chapter VII presents the major conclusions drawn from the data
analysis, and relate,s these conclusions to the hypothesis an9 propositions.
41
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Of course, the conclusions are definitive only within the limits of the
accuracy of the test and the validity of the theoretical framework.
Throughout this study there is a consistent effort to be conservative
where there is a likelihood of error.

Therefore, relationships that are

not clearly substantiated are presented as suggestions for further research rather than as conclusions.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This review of literature is intended to be selective and sugge stive of the significant works available, but not exhaustive.

The books

and articles mentioned below were chosen either because they illustrate
the use of survey techniques and quantitative analysis or because they
offer interesting propositions that may be developed into hypotheses.
Most of them will be referred to again during the analysis of the data,
but for now it is necessary to describe their contributions to research
in the subject area; they provide a context of background and perspective
in which to set the analysis and conclusions of this study.
Gamson, Lane, and Sears all examine the extent to which education or knowledge governs foreign policy opinions. 4 Gamsori, for
example, argues that increases in the level of knowledge do not necess~rily produce greater opinion consensus on foreign policy issues.
Basing his discussion on attitude surveys, he finds that the two main

4 William A. Gamson and Andre Modigliani, "Knowledge and
Foreign Policy Opinions, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, (Sµmmer, 1966),
187-2.00; Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, Public Opinion (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964).
7

8

determinants of foreign policy opinions are:

(1) pre-existing individual

attitudes; (2) prevalent or "mainstream" policy attitudes.
Gamson uses a "cognitive-consistency" model to evaluate public
opinion formation and knowledge.

The model employs three arbitrary

belief systems and tests the frequency with which respondents change
belief systems over a number of issues.

Findings indicate that increases

in knowledge at least provide £or more consistent belief patterns although
it does not determine the specific belief structure.
Lane and Sears examine a slightly different dimension of foreign
policy opinion.

They review the results of a study which found that edu-

cation, in particular college education, was not a significant variable
in the demonstration of a high level of political information.

They turn

to other influences such as family environment for the key determinants
of level of information.
Significantly, Lane and Sears maintain that circumstance and
immediate situation may to a large extent govern both level of information and the nature of an individual's opinion.

This is based on the pre-

mise that people may carefully select only the information necessary to
their functioning in a given situation.
ous.

Extreme cases of this are obvi-

The Fore.ign Service officer is more likely to be informed on inter~.

national affairs than the metal worker.

More subtle differences in situ-

ation, however, demand testing to establish the validity of the premise.
Rogers compared the foreign policy opinions of groups to their

9

level of information about the issue.

The study not only found disagree-

ment among the foreign policy views of the general public, but also among
· the "experts".

His evidence suggests that higher levels of information

· do not necessarily produce greater consensus on foreign policy issues. 5
A study by R eiselbach finds moderate correlations between the

traditional determinants of isolationist behavior and isolationism.

The

traditional determinants are: rural-midwest; Republic'an-conservative;
and ethnic perspective.

Because his study uses Congressional voting

records, Reiselbach encounters a major methodological problem.

Party

loyalty and pressure group activity may tend to influence voting on foreign policy issues as much as isolationist beliefs.

Demography and issue

salience are eventually judged to be the primary determinants of isolationist behavior. 6
McClosky devotes approximately half of his book to a discussion
of the merits, methodology,

and techniques of survey research.

The

remainder of the work is a detailed study of "Personality and Attitude
Corre late s of Foreign Policy Orientation".

This is an attempt to ". • •

explore on various fronts the utility of psychological constructs for explaining political beliefs, orientation, and activity. f, 7

5William C. Rogers, Barbara Stubler, and David A. Koenig, "A
Comparison of Informed and General Public Opinion On U .s. Foreign
Policy, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, 11 (Summer, 1967), .2.42.-2.53.
6Leroy N. Reiselbach, •iThe Basis of Isolationist Behavior, 11
Public Opinion Quarterl:x:, rv (Winter, 1960), 645-653.
7 He.rbert McClosky, Political Inquiry (London: Macmillan Company~ 1969), p. 71.

10
The rnain conceptual suggestion McClosky makes, for the purposes
of this study, is that beliefs may be scaled along an isolationist-nonisolationism continuwn.

He further divides these beliefs into aggressive-

nonaggressive, enabling a researcher to evaluate explicit beliefs on an
axis that might be graphically expressed as below:

Figure 1
Attitudinal Axis
Aggressive

II

Nonisolationist

Isolationist

IV

III
Nonaggressive

Although McClosky does not use this axis, it seems a fair representation of his conceptual framework, as well as a useful means of
arranging aggregate data for analysis of group belief systems.
Because McClosky' s study concentrates on the possible psychoiogical determinants of foreign policy orientations, hi"s treatment of the
dependent variables mentioned above is rriore valuable than his analysis
.
..
of independent variables.

11
Scott's approach is similar to McClosky 1 s in the emphasis of
the importance of psychological constructs in the explanation of an individual's behavior toward international relations.

Basically, his hypoth-

esis is that people tend to advocate relations among nations' which correspond structurally with their notions of ideal relations among people.
This emphasizes the impact of nonpolitical, or more general social values on foreign policy opinions. 8
In his section on the nature of American public opinion and foreign policy, Charles O. Lerche proposes four major characteristic shortcomings of American public opinion: ( 1) the general lack of information
possessed by American on foreign policy issues; (Z) the tendency of
Americans to be impatient about international affairs; (3) the highly
emotional character of American public opinion; (4) the preference for
- dichotomies manifested by Americans.

These four characteristics,

which are supported by survey data, are important considerations for
this study.

They figured significantly in the design of the questionnaire

and are important limitations on some of the conclusions. 9
In his analysis of political behavior and the determinants of political behavior, Bowen proceeds on an assumption advanced by many stu.;:;
dents in this area:

8 William A. Scott, "International Ideology and Interpersonal
Ideology, 11 Public Opinion Quarterly, III (Fall, 1960), 419-436.

9charles O. Lerche, Foreign Polic~ of the American Peo~le
(3rd ed.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:rentice-Hall, Inc., 1 67),
pp. 155-156.

12

• • • the amount and kind of information that an
individual possesses concerning politics is likely
to be a direct reflection of his group associations
at all levels of education and status. 10
The implication of this assumption for the study of foreign policy
opinion is that a particular group membership is likely to affect the substantive nature of an opinion.

Level of information and group member-

ship, then, are interrelated variables in the determination of an opinion.
Two central propositions advanced by Gabriel Almond provide
direction for the formulation and examination of a hypothesis.

The first

contains Almond's basic judgment on the nature of public attitudes and
opinions on foreign policy:
Attitudes and opinions on foreign policy are not only .
to be understood as responses to objective problem's
and situations, but as conditioned by culturally imposed qualities of character. These largely unconscious patterns of reactions and behavior strongly
influence the perception, selection, and evaluation
of political reality. 11
The above suggests that there are a _number of indirect and subtle influences that shape public opinion on foreign policy issues.

If the

influences are culturaUy based, as Almond suggests, they might include
social-economic status, level of education, and opportunities to participate in democratic processes.

Variations among groups with respect to

· these determinants, therefore, would produce subsequent aggregate

lODon R. Bowen, Political Behavior of the American Public
(Columbus Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968), p. 48.
York:

1 lGabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960), p. Z.9.

13
differences in foreign policy attitudes.
More specifically, Almond proposes that "The will to participate
in world affairs is an intellectual and learned attitude validated by imme·.;;
diate experience and moral pressure." lZ If this is the case, there will
. be differences in the foreign policy attitudes of the following groups of
persons: (1) persons of varying levels of education; (Z) persons who
have had varying amounts of exposure to the social science ·disciplines:
(3) persons who have varying amounts of moral pressure to hold foreign
policy opinions.

This moral pressure might come from peer groups,

organizational membership, or occupational demands.

This proposition

and _its implications provide the basis for the development of the hypothesis which this study investigates.
These studies represent the central body of knowledge· from which
this study proceeds.
McClosky' s.

The techniques employed are most similar to

The hypothesis and related propositions are generated

primarily by Almond's work.

A 11 of the studies suggest areas of inves-

tigation and familiarize the researcher with some of .the problems
he is
.
likely to ~ncounter in doing a public opinion study of foreign· affairs dispositions.

lZ A.lmond,

Op. Cit., p. 76.

CHAPTER III

HYPOTHESES AND DEFINITIONS

Introduction

This study is essentially a test of the propositions derived from
the body of knowledge reviewed in Chapter II.

Definitions of terms in

this chapter are listed immediately below the hypotheses and. propositions in which they fir st occur.

The definitions are of two types:

( 1)

Theoretical, i:q. which the concepts are defined " ••• in terms of other
concepts which are supposedly already under stood." 13 (2) Operational
definitions, which delineate the actual procedure used by this study to
measure the concept.

'Io the extent that the theoretical and operational

definitions are coincident and consistent in actual fact, the validity of
the concepts, and ultimately the validity of the hypotheses is tested.
Ideally, each concept in a testable hypothesis should be operationally
defined. 14 Some of the definitions in this chapter refer to concepts

13 Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York:
Hill B~ok Company, 1960), p. 9.

14Ibid., p. 11.

14

McGray-

15
that are not used in the hypotheses, but are used frequently in this study.

~ypothesis I
Consideration of Almond's work leads to the conclusion that: 15
As an individual's level of education increases, he tends to be
more internationalist than nationalist in his attitude toward world affairs.
If this hypothesis is valid, then this proposition will be supported

by the study:
Those individuals characterized by high levels of education are
more likely to be internationalist, and those characterized by low levels
are more likely to be nationalist.
Three groupings of individuals are examined in this study.
two basic groups are the faculty and the county officials.

The

The validity

of the hypotheses is tested when all respondents are members of one of
these two groups.

The third group is called the "aggregate".

In the

aggregate, the validity of the hypotheses is tested when au respondents
are combined for analysis without regard to their membership in the·
first two groups.
Level of Education is measured in terms ofthe amount of formal
e'ducation reported by the respondent.

Six categories are used ranging

from 0-8. years to graduate s.chool study at the Ph~ D. level.

In the ag-

gregate, and for the county officials, respondents are assigned to the

15Almond,

Op •. Cit., pp. 139-157.

16
high level of education category if they have completed some college
work or above.

The low level of education category includes individuals

with no college experience.

The faculty group are considered of high

level of education if they have completed graduate work at the M.A. or
PH.D. levels; low, if they have a B.A. or

B.s. 16

Nationalists are individuals whose political concerns and priorities.
are primarily focused on the issues and interests of their own county.
They tend to be much less concerned with the situation of the international
community than with the well-being and advantage of their nation.

Inter-

nationalists, on the other hand, are less concerned with national pride,
independence, and territorial integrity than harmony among nations,
cultural exchange, and active involvement in international affairs. 17
In the aggregate, respondents scoring on or above the mean score
of the aggregate on Levinson' s "Nationalism-Internationalism" scale
are considered nationalists. IS All persons scoring below the aggregate
mean are classified internationalists.

Likewise, members of both elite

groups are categorized as either nationalists or internationalists depend16 oemographic characteristics include party affiliation and level
of education as. well as the "hard" facts such as age, sex, and marital
status. Some studies exclude the former, but for the sake of simplicity,
this study considers them all as demographic variables.
17 McClosky, Op. Cit., p. 77.
18 0. J. Levinson, "Authoritarian Personality a~d Foreign Policy," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (March, 1957), pp. 37-47.

17
ing upon whether they score above or below the mean score of their respective group.
tive attitude.

To this extent, nationalism-internationalism is a rela-

Respondents are compared to other individuals in the group.

It should also be noted that the nationalist-internationalist division in this
study is somewhat artificial.

The use of the mean score as a dividing

line is arbitrary, but consistent.

The categories are labeled "nationalist"

and "internationalist", but should be more accurately understood as
m·eaning "more nationalist" and "more internationalist".
Both nationalists and internationalists may be further characterized by their militarist-pacifist tendencies.
to clarify nationalism-internationalism.

This dimension is included ·

No hypothesis regarding mili-

tarist-pacifist attitudes is advanced when this dimension is analyzed.
· The ·fundamental proposition about this attitude is that it is independent
of nationalism-internationalism attitude changes.19 Respondents are
more militarist if they score below the mean for their group on Droba' s
"Militarism-Pacificism" scale.
ZO Similarly, if .they score on or above
.
'

the mean, they are classified as more pacifist.

Hypothesis II

Drawing on the work of Almond and Lane and Sears, it is possible

l9McClosky, Op. Cit., p. 73.
20 n. D. Droba, "A Scale To Measure Militarism-Pacificism, 11
Journal of Educational Psychology, XXII (January, 1931), pp. 96-111.

---~----

18

to conclude:Z 1
The more education an individual has completed, the more informed he will tend to be about international affairs.
This study therefore· expects to validate the following proposition: :
Individuals characterized by high levels of educa~ion are more
likely to exhibit high levels of information about foreign affairs than
individuals of low levels of education.

Hypothesis III

Lane and Sears propose that an individual's level of information
will, in itself, affect his attitude structure. 2.2.· Under these conditions,
a pers~m' s opinion is a direct reflection of the amount of information
he has gathered.

This would indicate that:

An individual's specific disposition toward foreign affairs will
·be dependent on the amount of information he possesses about foreign
affairs.
From this, and the pre<:eding propositions, it is possible to conclude that:
Illa.

· Higli information individuals are more likely to be internationalist

than low information individuals.

IIIb.

Low information individuals are more likely to be nationalist than
2.1.
Almond, 22_. Cit.,. p. 7 6 •
2.2.Lane and Sear-s, Op. 9_!!., p. 13.
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high information individuals.
At· this stage, two alternative causal models are evident.

Sym-

bolically, they may be expressed as below:

Figure 2
Models of Causal Linkage

X

-

,f, 1 -------~....

~

:;,,

y

Xz Model I

Model II
Where:

x1
X

• level of education

z

Y

= level of information

• nationalism-internationalism attitude

· In the first model, education and level of information interact to
produce a specific attitude.

Each is partially responsible for an indi-

vidual's eventual disposition.

The second model indicates a linear flow

of causation where education determines level of information, and level

of information determines the eventual attitude.

A third possibility,

which involves the rejection of Hypothesis III, would show that education
determines attitudes directly.

In this case, .level of inf9rmation would

be irrelevant.
In this study, a ~cale drawing on television news broadcasts and,
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newspapers is used to evaluate an individual's level of information.
Respondents scoring on or above the mean score of their group are understood to exhibit high levels of information.

Respondents scoring below

the mean exhibit low levels of information about foreign affairs.

!:!re'Othe sis IV

In order to examine the impact of different types of education on
foreign affairs dispositions, respondents were asked how many social
science courses they had completed.

On the basis of the following hy-

pothesis, an individual's exposure to the social sciences is tested for
a possible relationship to his attitudes:
Among individuals with college experience, those with backgrounds in the social sciences will have significantly different attitudes
than those with little or no social science background.
For the purposes of this study, two propositions are offered:
IVa.

Individuals with high levels of social science background are more

likely to be internationalist, and those with low levels of social science
background are more likely to be nationalist in their foreign affairs disposition.
IVb.

Individuals with high levels of social science background are more

likely to exhibit high levels of information, and those with low levels of
social science background are more likely to exhibit low levels of information about foreign affairs.

Zl
College social sciences include:
ology, economics, and anthropology.

political science, history, soci-

Respondents who reported having

studied a number of courses that is on or above the mean number for
their group are characterized by high levels of background.

Those below

the mean are considered low .level background individuals.

Hypothesis V

The degree to which an individual's curiosity and interest in
foreign affairs influence his attitudes and level of information is largely
unexplored,

One reason for the lack of research in this area is the

problem of obtaining accurate: self-evaluations,

To examine this area,

the following hypothesis is advanced:
Individuals who are interested in foreign affairs will have significantly different amounts of information and different attitudes from
those who are not interested.
This hypothesis results in two propositions:
Va.

Higher levels of interest will be accompanied by higher levels

of information among ind ivid ua ls.
Vb.

Individuals with high levels of interest are more likely to be

internationalist, and those with low levels of interest are more likely
to be nationalist in their foreign affairs disposition.
Two indicators measure level of interest in this study:

(I) Self-

evaluation, in which the respondent is directly asked if he is interested
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in foreign affairs.

Responses of "very interested" or "moderately in-

terested" ar~ placed in the high level of interest category.

Responses

of "interested, but not informed" or "not at all interested" are low levels
of interest.

(2) Indirect self-evaluation, in which individuals are asked

to what extent they use radio or television newsbroadcasts or newspapers
to keep informed.

They either indicated that they did use the media

regularly or that they did not_ use them regularly.

Hypothesis VI

Gabriel Almond implies that an individual's foreign affairs disposition is partially determined by his ". ~ . immediate experience and
moral pressure. 11 23 To the extent that elite group membership is a
type of immediate experience which generates a certain moral pressure
and demands on its members, the following hypothesis is offered:
Members of respective elite groups will be characterized by
different levels of information and attitudes.
With the preceding propositions and the generally higher level
of education among the faculty group in mind, the following propositions
are expected to be valid:
Via.

Members of intellectual elites are more likely to exhibit high

levels of information about foreign affairs than members of political
elites.
23 Almond,

Op. Cit., p. 76.
0
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Vlb.

Members of intellectual elites are more likely to be internation-

alist, and members of political elites are more likely to be nationalist
in their foreign affairs disposition.
Elite groups are characterized by high levels of homogeneity,
social cohesiveness, and awareness among the membership of their
inclusion in the group.

Individuals in an elite group share certain com-

mon sets of values that are considered socially scarce and worthy of
esteem from other members of society.

These values may be used to

characterize the nature of the specific elite under consideration~

This

study deals with elites that are opinion-holders rather than decisionmakers as far as foreign policy is concerned.
The focus is on two elites in this study: ( I) The intellectual elite,
which is characterized by consistently high levels of education, involvement in scholarship, teaching, and related activities.

A sample of fac-

ulty members at Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois, represents this elite.

(Z) The political elite which is characterized by rela-

tively high levels of political activity and influence on public affairs.
Often, members of the political elite occupy formal, elected political
office.

A sample of elected county officials in Coles County, Illinois,

represents the political elite.

Hypothesis VII

If elite group membership constitutes a moral pressure which
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influences the attitudes of the individual, membership in other groups
will also influence attitudes to a certain extent.

From this assumption,

the following conclusion is drawn:
The number of voluntary organizations to which an individual
belongs will influence the amount of information he possesses and his
attitudes.
Two specific propositions devolve from this hypothesis:
Vlla.

Persons indicating high levels of membership in voluntary organi-

zations are more likely to exhibit high levels of information, and those
with low levels of membership are more likely to exhibit low levels of
information.
Vllb.

Persons indicating high levels of organizational membership are

n:iore likely to be internationalists, and those with low levels of organization membership are more likely to be nationalist in their foreign
affairs disposition.
Respondents indicating membership in a number of voluntary
organizations on or above the mean are placed in the high level category.
Those who belong to a number below the mean are low level respondents.
Voluntary organizations include civic, fraternal, or professional groups
or clubs.
In the preceding propositions, the phrase "more likely" denotes
a relationship between the two variables which equals or exceeds one of
the three orders of significance established at the end of Chapter V.
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The validation of a proposition does not prove the existence of
. a cause and effect relationship between the two variables.

At the moat,

it indicates some degree of covariance between them.

At the same time,

however, there are causal implications in this study.

To some extent,

the independent variables, level of education, elite group membership,
and so on, are understood to be causal factors of the dependent variable.
At a higher level of generalization and a higher order of sophistication,
the demographic variables are at least partially causal to the dispositional variables.

The following is a symbolic expression of the causal

form of the hypotheses in this chapter.

Figure 3
Causal Form of Hypotheses I-VII
Key:

.

i.
t·

~

An increase in
A decrease in •••

• Causes

X1 ... 7 • The independent variable including education, level of

information, social science background, elite group
membership., and voluntary organizati.on membership,
or all of the demographic variables.
• The dependent variables, nationalism-internationalism,
level of information, essentially the dispositional or
attitudinal variables.
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As noted above, the precise causal interrelationships among the inde:pendent variables and their subsequent relationship to the dependent
variables remain to be determined.
Essentially, this chapter is the operational transformation of
Almond's !:\tatement, "The will to participate in world affairs" into a
relative score on the nationalism-internationalism scale; whether it is
" ••. an intellectual and learned attitude .•• 11 is measured by level of
formal education, social science background,· interest, and level of information; whether it is

11 • • •

validated by. immediate experience and

moral pressure" is indicated by elite group membership, membership
in voluntary organizations, and, to some degree, level of information. 24
The relationships among these indicators is made explicit by the
formulation of the propositions.

Seven related hypotheses are advanced

because the validation of one or more of the propositions may indicate
relationships of a higher order of generalization.

24 Ibid •.

CHAPTER IV

THEOR ET ICA L ORIENT AT ION

A central problem of theoretical concern is conceptualization

and the interrelation of concepts.

This chapter is a discussion of major

concepts which are basic. to this study.

The discussion is not intended

to develop an exhaustive middle range theory of the role of political
attitudes.

More simply, it is a consideration of more r,.arrow theoreti-

cal scope especially pertinent to the focus of this study.
From various sources, Shaw and Wright distill a definition of
the concept of attitude:
A relatively enduring system of evaluative, affective

reactions based upon and reflecting the evalui;ttive concepts or beliefs which have been learned about the
characteristics of a social object or.class of social
objects. 2 5
More specifically, an attitude is " ..• an affective component which
is based upon cognitive proc~sses and is an antecedent of behavior. 112 6
From this definition, the significance of attitudes is quite apparent.

25 Marvin E. Shaw and Jack M. Wright, Scales For The Measurement of Attitudes (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967), p. 3.
2 6 1bid. , pp. 2. - 3.

2. 7
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Political attitudes, for instance, immediately precede and direct politi. cal behavior.

In one sense they are similar to political motives in that

they provide direction for the resulting behavior.

Unlike motives, how-

ever, attitudes are neither drive-producing or necessarily goal- specific. Z 7
Attitudes are the sum of beliefs about an object and the

11 • • •

evalu-

ation of the preferability of the characteristics or existence of the object. 112 8 In the context of the previously advanced definition, attitudes
are also value-related.

The affective expression of the worth or value

of an oJ>ject is an important component of attitudes.
Shaw and Wright examine several characteristics of attitudes
that are implicit in the foregoing discussion.
1.

Attitudes are directly related to overt, motivated behavior.

To

the extent that they precede and direct behavior, knowledge of a
specific attitude holds certain clues to eventual behavior.
2.

Attitudes are understood to vary along a continuum in both intensity and quality.

The continuum runs for strong preference through

neutrality to strong aversion for the social object.
serious operational problem.

This poses a

If attitudes actually vary along a

continuum, any demarcation of the continuum is likely to be a
distorted reflection of the attitude.
3.

Attitudes are learned and cognitive rather than inherent, genetic,

27Shaw and Wright, Qe_. Cit., p. 5.
28 Ibid., p. 4.
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or the result of biological or instinctual processes.

Attitudes

have the same charactistics common to all learning in that they
may be reinforced, maintained, or altered.
4.

Attitudes refer to specific social objects or sets of social objects.
They may be more or less complex or specific depending upon
the complexity or specificity of the referent object and the degree
of individual elaboration of the attitude.

The extent to which the

attitude is well-developed and consistent with other attitudes seems
to depend upon the relevance of a particular social object to the
individual.
5.

Attitudes are more or less interrelated.

Central attitudes about

relevant social objects tend to be more closely and logically interrelated than peripheral attitudes.

Because they are interrelated,

attitudes are resistant to change.

Frequent alteration of central

attitudes involves alteration of many related peripheral attitudes.
Interrelatedness, therefore, demands some amount of stability.
Frequent changing of an individual's highly complex attitudinal
structure would result in constant confusion at the very least. 29
Opinions are the expression of attitudes.

A specific opinion may

be the result of the influence and interrelatedness of several attitudes.
Often, opinions are more specific than attitudes.

For example, an in-

dividual has an attitude toward war which influences his opinion about

Z9shaw and Wright, Op. Cit., pp. 6-10.
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a specific war.

The most common form of attitude-expres,sion or

opinion-holding is verbal.

Although actions express attitudes, they are

more precisely overt behavior,

In a peripheral sense, of course,

opinion-holding is a form of human behavior.
Various factors may influence the learning, maintainance, or
alteration of attitudes.

Political attitudes should be understood to be

similar to other sets of attitudes with respect to their development.
Social circumstance, formal education, peer group associations, and
the relevance of politics as a social object all contribute to the development of a particular political attitude.
influences political behavior.

In turn, the attitude directly

The .researcher's access to the nature

of the attitude is through the individual's opinion.

Clearly, opinion and

overt behavior, voting, protest activity, and campaigning, for instance,
are not always in perfect coincidence.

To the degree that they coincide,

however, knowledge of an individual's opinion may be of value in predicting his behavior.

Information about the present political opinions

of an individual may provide clues to his behavior in the future because
opinions reflect attitudes, which are relatively stable and enduring.
It has been proposed that attitudes are learned and subject to
change.

They .are learned from specific sets of social experiences.

Some of these experiences have a stronger impact on the development
of specific attitudes than others..

Knowledge of which experiences tend

to produce particular attitudes is of predictive value.

This study finds
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that level of education is positively related to internationalist tendencies.

Militarist or pacificist tendencies, on the other hand are not re-

lated to level of education.

Within the limitations of this study' s find-

ings, an observer noting an overall increase in a nation's level of education would predict a general shift toward internationalism, but no
necessary change in militarism-pacificism attitudes.
Within this theoretical framework, a change in attitudes entails
a necessary change in behavior.

Nationalist-internationalist and

militarist-pacifist opinions are examined in this study.

One underlying

assumption is that these· opinions reflect similar attitudes which, in
turn, direct appropriate behavior.
yond the scope of this study.

Resultant behavior patterns are be-.

By way of a brief example, however, na-

tionalist behavior would include a willingness to more readily accept
nationalist-oriented foreign policies.

Militarist behavior might include

a readiness to support the rise of military force in the resolution of
international conflict.
Various social experiences not only determine the specific nature of political attitudes, but also determine whether or not specific
political attitudes are central or peripheral.

Political referent objects

which are more relevant to an individual are more likely to be central
in his attitudinal structure.

Central attitudes are more likely to be

complex, interrelated, and logically consistent than peripheral attitudes.
An individual actively collects and experiences more information about
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referent objects that are important to him,

Increased amounts of infor-

mation allow for more elaborately developed and consistent attitudes.
To some degree this creates attitudinal stability because existing predispositions will sort the information and experiences the individual
receives.
Theoretically, demographic variables describe the individual's
life experiences and situation and a particular point in time,

Operation-

ally, selected demographic variables are expressed quantitatively to
measure their impact on attitudes and behavior.

Unfortunately, these

operations are often applied to the demographic variables which are
easily qua:ntified rather than those that may appear most theoretically·
significant.
McClosky' s study of the "Personality and Attitude Correlates
of Foreign Policy Orientation" is somewhat of an effort to circumvent
this operational problem, 30 If apparently significant theoretical variables could not be measured directly, their most immediate effects,
their psychological results that is, might be accurately measured.

Ob-

viously, the impact of variables such as child-rearing practices, emotional trauma, and personal success or failure might be more accurately
determined through indirect measurement of their psychological effects
at the current stage of scientific development.
This study does not take exception to the possible theoretical sig-

3 ?McClosky, .2E_: Cit,
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nificance of these initial and highly personal variables or McClosky's
measurement techniques.

A major contention of this study, however,

is that there are a number of relatively easily accessible and measurable variables which have significant influence on the development of
political attitudes.

These variables are susceptible to change, and

will significantly alter the attitudes of the individuals they effect.

Their

effects on a wide range of political attitudes have been tested by previous researchers.

An extensive, systematic analysis of the impact of

demographic variables on nationalist-internationalist attitudes, and
foreign affairs disposition in general, however, has been largely ignored.
The theoretical significance of this study, therefore, rests on an examination of the possible validity .and· relevance of some of these variables
to a specific attitude.

CHAPTER V

DESCRIPTION OF THE TEST

The selection of the survey technique as a means of gathering
data to test the validity of the hypothesis and propositions dictated the
design of a questionnaire.

Four criteria were considered important

limitations on the design and construction of the questionnaire:

( 1) The

form of the questionnaire had to reduce as much as possible the cost of
its construction and administration.

With this in mind, an answer sheet

separate from the questionnaire was used to record responses, eliminating the necessity of reproducing the five page questionnaire some
eighty times.

Also, the use of the answer sheet allowed. for extensive

pre-coding of responses and the use of a relatively simple scoring key
and post-coding procedure, thereby reducing the amount of time needed
to transform unprocessed information into data compatible with existing computer programs.

The additional time required ~o pre-code and

design the questionnaire was more than compensated for by the time
saving realized when encoding the data for computer input.
(2) Accuracy in the .measurement of both the opinions and the
demographic factors was perhaps the most difficult of the criteria to
34
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meet.

The internationalism-nationalism scale and the militarism-

pacifism scale had both been previously tested by researchers. 31

The

selection of these two particular tests rather than the many others available was governed by a judgment of their appropriateness to the hypothe~is being tested.

Secondly, the tests were evaluated by an examination

of their reliability in "Split-half", "Test-Retest", and validity correlates establish~d by previous researchers. 3Z
The level of information test was developed by the author with
the guidance of academic personnel at Eastern Illinois University, and
the extensive use of survey research literature. 33 Special attention
· was given to covering a wide range of foreign affairs issue areas.

The

final forms of the demographic questions were tested for clarity, precision, and the degree to which they consistently elicited the de sired
information.

Specific limitations regarding the accuracy of each ~ection

31 See
· Droba, Op. Cit., and Levinson, Op. Cit.
32 see Shaw, Op. Cit., pp. 16-21. In the "Test-Retest Method .••
The attitude scale is administered to the same group of persons at two
different times, and the correlation between the two sets of scores is
computed." (p. 16) The "Split-half Method, .. estimates reliability by
treating each of two or more parts of the attitude scale as a separate
scale, .. the reliability estimate is the correlation between the scores
of the separate scales." (p. 17),
3 31 relied on Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald W. Hursh, Sur~~esearch (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1963) for phrasing the questions and statement sequence. The content of the questions
was taken from metropolitan newspapers in consultation with Dr. John R,
Faust, Professor of Political Science, Eastern Illinois University. Refinement of the scale after the pre-test was done with the assistance of
Dr. Thomas E. Scism,· Professor of Political Science, Eastern Illinois
University.
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of the questionnaire are discussed more fully in Chapter VI.
(3)

The questionnaire is as comprehensive as possible given the

restrictions of cost and the desire for brevity.

If the null hypothesis

were supported, it seemed desirable to be able to explain its support
in terms of as many variables as possible.

For this reason, a good

deal of information other than level of education was obtained.
The Militarism-Pacificism test was included in order to add
another dimension to the Internationalism-Nationalism measurement.
This test would ho_pefully give more precision to the evaluation of the
questionnaire in general.
(4)

The pressures supporting brevity were compelling: the use

of volunteer, relatively inexperienced, personnel for administration,
the size of the project, the time available for completion, and the caveats of Messrs. Backstrom and Hursh argued for severe restrictions. 34
Initial tests by inexperienced interviewers required between thirty and
forty minutes per respondent.

Experienced interviewers eventually

gathered data at an average rate of fifteen to twenty minutes per respond- ,
ent.
In its final form the questionnaire has four major sections prefaced by "Instructions To The Interviewers". 35 The first section, which
includes twelve questions, constitutes the internationalism-nationalism

34 Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., pp. 60, 69-70, llZ-13, 130.
· 35See Appendix A for the complete questionnaire in its final form.
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scale (IN).

The scale was developed by Levinson in 1957. 36 It is a

Likert-type scale with a range of scores from 10-70.

The starred items

on the questionnaire included in the appendix are statements expressing
an internationalist position; the others express a nationalist position.
{The items were not starred on the questionnaires used for actual interviews~)
Respondents were allowed six degrees of agreement or disagreement ranging from strong support to strong opposition.
made for no response.

Provision was

Each item is given a score ranging from 1-7;

+3 is equivalent to 1; -3 is equivalent to 7.

For starred items, the scor-·

fag is reversed; +3 is then equivalent to 7; -3 is equivalent to 1.

The

mean of the total items scores is multiplied by ten; the higher the resulting scores, the stronger the nationalist position.
As it was administered by Levinson, the test yielded a mean of
31. 8, a standard deviation of lZ. 5, and a range of 10-64.

The eighty-

four subjects were a rather highly diversified group of students at Har- .
vard University. 37 Levinson' s findings correspond roughly with .the
results discussed in Chapter VI of this study.
Three significant modifications were made on the original scale.•.
The first statement originally read: "We need more leaders like MacAithui-,
who have the morals and strength to put national honor above appease-

36Levinson,

Op. Cit., pp. 37-47.

.37 Ibid., p. 41.
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ment. "38 MacArthur's name was deleted from the final version because
its inclusion seems less significant now than in 1957 when the scale was
developed.

The strong nationalist sentiment, and even some military

overtone seemed to remain after the deletion.

Some of the confusion

expressed by pre-test respondents was eliminated.

In its final form,

the statement reads: "We need more leaders who have the morals and
strength to put national honor above appeasement."
The sixth statement originally read: "Our best policy in China
would be to forget about Chiang-Kai-shek, and to work for a coalition
between the Communists and the 'center' parties. 11 39 This statement
is also oriented toward an issue that is somewhat dated.

In an attempt

to preserve the internationalist sentiment of the statement and update
its issue content, it was changed to read:

"Our best policy in Viet Nam

would be to forget about the Saigon government, and work for an agreement with the Communists."
The third significant modification is that the test was administered orally to respondents in this survey.
taken silently by the respondents.

The original tests were

In order to minimize the effects of

this difference, respondents were given a card with the choices of agree ..
m ent and disagreement printed in the same form as on the original test.
Interviewers were allowed to repeat

38Levinson, Op. Cit., p. 41.
3 9Ibid.,

a statement twice if requested

to .
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by the respondent, but were not allowed to return to a statement if they
had proceded to a subsequent statement.

The interviewers were not

allowed to change a response once they had recorded

a response and

read a subsequent statement.
The second major section consists of a twelve-item militarismpacifism scale (MP).

It is an equal-appearing interval scale developed

by Droba in 1931. 4 o Even though it is some forty years old, the highly
general nature of the statements would seem to insulate it from changing
issues.
Each item is assigned an equivalent number, depending upon how
pro-militarist the statement is.

The subject responds by indicating

either agreement or disagreement with the sentiment of the statement.
The equivalent numbers of statements with which the respondent agrees
are totaled, giving a possible score between 0- lZZ.

A higher score in-

dicates a more pacifistic position.
Droba' s test was first administered to four hundred college students at the University of Chicago.

It yielded a mean of approximately

11. 77 and a maximum standard deviation of

z. 35. 41

These figures are

considerably lower than the ones obtained in Chapter VI of this study.
Two changes were made in the original test.
consisted of forty-four items.

The final test was reduced to twelve

.40 Droba, Op. Cit., pp. 96-111.
41 Ibid., p~ 108.

The original test
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items by selecting every fourth statement from the original.

The pri-

mary reason for abbreviating the test was reduction of the time needed
to administer the questionnaire.

This was justified because the scale

was intended for this study primarily as an additional dimension to the
IN scale.

Its use as a separate independent variable is not crucial for

the support of the alternate hypothesis.
The essential quantitative characteristics of the scale were preserved, and no other judgment other than the choice of every fourth
statement beginning with the first was used.

The original scale ranged

from Oto 462; the final scale from Oto 122.

The hypothetical mean

value of a statement on the original scale was 10. 5; for the final scale,
10.

The minimum statement value on the original scale was O; on the

final scale also O.

The maxi.mum statement value on the original was

21; on the final scale also 21.
The second modification was the oral administration of the test,
which was originally administered silently.

As in the case of the IN

test, interviewers were allowed to repeat a statement twice if necessary, but not allowed to reread or change a response once they had proceded t'o a following statement.
The third section of the questionnaire is a twelve item information level test (IL).

The test was designed by the author to measure

a wide range of familiarity with foreign affairs and foreign policy issues.
Approximately 50 per cent 6£:the questions are concerned with United
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States foreign policy; the remainder with foreign affairs in general.
An attempt was made to insure wide geographic and issue distribution
in both areas.

The types of questions include:

Name recognition, treaty

recognition, country recognition, and situation recognition.'
Generally, the questions proceed from the less difficult to the
more difficult.

The range <;>f difficulty is fairly large because of the

possibility of having to scale persons of low education levels (less than
eight years formal education) and low interest levels, with persons of
high education levels (Ph.D.) and high interest levels.

Pre-test results

indicated that the test was capable of scaling both of these extremes,
while preserving an acceptable distribution around the hypothetical mean
score.

These results are corroborated in the final survey results.

The range of the scale is 0-60, five points being awarded for each correct answer.

Higher sco~es indicate higher information levels.

Two changes were made on the basis of pre-test experience.
The test was administered orally, under the same rules of repetition
and response change as the IN and MP tests.

The length of the response

choices in the IL test, however, tended to confuse a good number of
respondents.

Consequently, during the actual survey an answer sheet

with the printed responses was given to the subject during the IL test.
The statemen,ts and the responses were read by the interviewer while
the subject followed the responses on his answer sheet.
On the sample questionnaire provided in the Appendix the cor-
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rect answers are underlined.
lined.

Question 28 has both "C" and "D" under-

The test was prepared and pre-tested after President Nixon had

announced the easing of some trade restrictions with the People's Republic of China, but before Presidential Advisor Henry Kissinger's first
visit to mainland China.

During the actual survey it bec_ame apparent

that the visit, which had just taken place, made response "D" very close
to a correct answer.

Moderately informed respondents seemed quite

confused about whether to answer "C" or "D".

As a result, all respond-

ents were given credit for either "C" or "D" responses.

Questionnaires

used in the survey, of course, did not have underlined answers.
The fourth section of the questionnaire includes questions relating to self-evaluation and demographic factors.

Because of the rela-

tively low level of organizational membership, questions 41 through 43
were combined in the post-coding to produce a single variable of "organization membership" (OM).

The details of each demographic variable

are discussed in Chapter VI under the appropriate section.
The order of appearance of each section is significant.

The

IN and MP opinion tests were presented first to gain the respondent's
confidence and a,cquaint him with the questionnaire.

The IL test, which

has correct or incorrect answer choices, is third, followed by the selfevaluative and demographic questions.

The interview experience of the

author supports this particular organization as an effective means of
gaining a respondent's confidence and reducing his inhibitions. · Chang·ing the order of the sections resulted in visible antagonism, and respond-

43
ent irritation in some cases during the pre-tests.

The final organiza-

tion plan of the questionnaire, then, is to proceed from the general to
the specific.
With the questionnaire designed, thirteen volunteer interviewers
were chosen.

A 11 were stud.ents at Eastern Illinois University.

received two one-hour briefings from the author.

They

The first hour was

devoted to an explanation of survey techniques and a checklist of "do' s
and don'ts" of interviewing. 42 The second hour reviewed interviewing
techniques and trained the interviewers in the use of the questionnaire
and answer sheet employed in this survey.
Subsequent meetings with interviewers after they had administered pre -tests answered their questions resulting from initial field
experiences.

The pre-test indicated that the scales were well-adjusted

and indicated some changes that were necessary. 43
The samples used in this survey were drawn from two groups.
A random sample of fifty faculty members at Eastern Illinois Univer-

sity was drawn.

Initial estimates of the time available for interview-

ing suggested a sample size of approximately forty for each group.
The faculty sample was "overdrawn" by ten to compensate for "not at
homes" and refusals.

The faculty sample is a fairly accurate propor-

tional representation of each school. 44 Because of the relatively small
42

Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., p. 138.

43 Ibid., pp. 129-130.'
44 The characteristics of the sample, including proportion of members per school, education level, and male-to-female proportions were
similar to overall characteristics of the faculty.

44
size of the sample, however, the proportionality of the sample by aca. demic department does not correspond with the population.
The sample of elected county officials in Coles County includes
the following groups: County Officers, County Supervisors; Assistant
Supervisors; and County Highway Commissioners.
three persons.

The total is forty-

Forty successful interviews were completed.

Approximately eighty per cent of the county official interviews
and fifty per cent of the faculty interviews were completed in two weeks
of field work.

The remainder were accomplished in a third week of

interviewing.
At this stage, two limitations of this study become apparent.
The use of volunteer interviewers who have limited training and experience is likely to introduce some amount of error or distortion.

This

may have been somewhat minimized by the training sessions, the pretest experience, close supervision, and the fact that the author completed
approximately fifty per cent of the interviews.
The size of the sample is also a limiting factor.

The sample

size was dictated primarily by the time available for completion of the
survey within the requirements of statistical validity. 4 5 In one sense
the necessity of using volunteer interviewers and the de sire for a large
sample are mutually exclusive considerations.

The confidence and re-

liability increments afforded by an increase in sample size may well

45 Blalock, Op. Cit., pp. 165-167, ZZ5-ZZ7.

45
have been counteracted by the increased distortion introduced by employing more interviewers, or by increasing the work load of existing
· interviewers.

A final balance of eighty respondents and thirteen inter-

viewers was decided upon.
The results of the interviews were scored and post-coded according to the directions in the Code Book included in the Appendix.

The

task was relatively straight-forward because of the use of closed responses
and extensive pre-coding. 4 6 These data were transferred. to computer
matrix sheets, and then to computer punch cards.
The data and a program format detailing the operations to be
performed on each variable was submitted to a technician £or programming and processing.
Two separate programs were employed.

The. standard deviation,

mean, standard error, and range of the data were determined using
DMB01D. 4 7 The second program, DMBOZS, calculated the chi square,
chi square d. f., contingency coefficient, and table percentages for the

46 Backstrom and Hursh discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using "closed responses", in which the respondent has only
listed options as choices. The central problem with "open responses"
is the amount of time and effort required to code them for quantitative
analysis. Further, they increase the time ·required to administer the
interview. See Backstrom and Hursh, Op. Cit., pp. 73-74.
47see W. J. Dixon, Ed., BMD: Biomedical Computer Programs
(Berkely: University of California Press, 1964).
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selected data. 48
With the exception of the party affiliation variable, the tables
are exclusively 2.x2.

The size of the sample precluded the effective

use of larger tables because of the possibility of encountering empty
cells. 49 All demographic variables except occupation and academic
discipline were tested for possible relationship with each of the three
dependent variables, IN, MP, and IL.

In turn, the dependent variables

were tested for possible relationship among the three.

Occupation and

academic discipline were not tested for chi square significance because
of the low number of cases in the resultant aggregates.
Three levels of significance were used to evaluate the results:
1.

The alternate hypothesis is "supported" if a chi square of

3. 841 or higher at . 05 probability is indicated.

Essentially, this means

that the chances of finding a chi square of this magnitude if the relation:..·
ship between the two variables were random is one in twenty.
2.

The alternate hypothesis is "strongly supported" if a chi

48 For a description of BMD02S see Kenneth Janda, Data Processing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), p. 159.
The entire program format may be found in W. J. Dixo~, ed., BMD:
Biomedical Computer Programs (Berkely: University of California
Press, 1964).
49

The accurate calculation of chi square requires at least five
occurances per cell. For figures of five and below, Blalock suggests
the use of a "continuity correction". Essentially, this tends to give more
conservative. Because of the conservative criteria used to evaluate this
data, however, no corrections were added. The use of larger than 2x2
tables, however, would have necessitated the use of the correction in all
cases, and made a good number of the tests invalid because of frequent
occurances of empty cells. See Blalock, Op. Cit., pp. 220-ZZl.
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square of 6. 635 or higher at . 01 probability is indicated.

In this case,

the chances are one in a hundred of a chi square of this magnitude with
no relationship between the variables.
3.

The alternate hypothesis is "validated" if a chi square of

10. 827 or higher at • 001 probability is indicated.

At this level of con-

fidence, there is a 99. 9 per cent probability of the relationship between
the variables being other than random. 50
Standard error was used to evaluate the extent to which each
dependent variable could be used effectively to test for a relationship
with the independent variables.

Key states that: "As the Standard of

Error of estimate of Y approaches· in size the standard deviation of Y,
the •.• degree of relationship between X and Y values declines. 1151 In
no case did the standard of error approach the· standard deviation for
the variables tested.
The major limitation on the use of chi square is the relatively
small size of the sample employed.
used, however.

No statistical corrections were

In Chapter VI, the estimates of reliability become more

conservative if cell numbers approach five or smaller.

There is essen-

tially little advantage to employing a statistical device to compensate
for continuity, as long as this is taken into consideration in the final

50Blalock,

Op. Cit., p. 452.

51 v. O. Key, A Primer of Statistics for Political Scientists
(New York: Crowell, 1954), p. 93.

48
analysis of the data.
It might be noted that although the relatively small size of this
sample may cause some distortion of the results, large values of chi
square are more difficult to obtain with a small sample.· I£ large values
appear in a small sample, they indicate greater certainty of a relationship than the same values for a large sample. 52
Causal inferences from this sort of data must be made with caution.

Chi square will indicate the existence of relationships significantly

different than those expected under a given set of hypothetical assumptions (the null hypothesis). 53 It does not, however, indicate the direction of the relationship, or that the relationship is causal.'

52 Blalock, Op. Cit., p. 230.
53 Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Preliminary Remarks

The following analysis is a detailed description of the sample
characteristics, the dependent variables, and the independent variables
which produce significant relationships.

Independent variables which

yield less than ·significant relationships are discussed briefly.

When

appropriate, findings are related to previous research reported in this
area.
Tables that are especially long or only supplementary to the central discussion are included in Appendix B.
are expressed as percentages.

Where noted all figures

The number of respondents for the ag-

gregate (both groups combined) data is eighty; for faculty and county
officials respectively, the number of respondents is always forty.

The

chi square and probability for each relationship are listed immediately
below each table.

A 11 decimal figures are rounded to the nearest one-

tenth.
On the basis of the levels of significance presented in Chapter V,

49

50
the degree to which each relationship supports the hypothesis under inve stigation is assessed.

Quantitative Profile of the Sample

This is a brief consideration of some 0£ the major characteristics of the sample. 54 When both groups are combined to yield aggregate
results, they produce the following mean scores: Nationalism-Internationalism (IN) • 39. 9; Militarism-Pacificism (MP) • 55. 3; Information
Level (IL) • 40. 8. 55
The mean of the IN variable compares favorably with the actual
mean of Levins·on's original study.

The original mean score of 31.8

is close enough to the mean score of this study to indicate that attitudes
on this scale have not shifted appreciably since 1957. 56 Likewise, the
small differences between the range and standard deviation of Levinson' s
study and this study are not significant if differences iri the groups under
analysis are taken into account.
The mean score of the MP variable, however, is considerably
higher than Droba' s original 11. 8.

The higher standard deviation and

greater range of scores in this study indicates a shift to pacifist attitudes
and considerably less consensus of attitudes since Droba' s initial study
54 A complete quantitative profile of the sample 'is found in Ap-.
pendix B.
55 See Appendix B.
56

Levinson,

Op. Cit., pp. 37-47.

51
57

in 1931.

.
Many factors combine to account for this shift.

American

experiences in the Korean War, and more recently in Viet Nam, have
· undoubtedly contributed to changing this attitude.

The rather grim real-

ities of these wars and the advent of nuclear weapons may figure largely
in the shift to a more pacifist mean score.

The divisive effects of United

States involvement in Viet Nam may contribute to the larger range of
opinion.
The IL mean score of the actual survey is close to the pre-test
mean score.

Because this test was developed especially for this sur:..·

vey, no previous results are available for comparison.
The relatively small size of the sample and the low instances
of membership in voluntary organizations in many cases necessitated
combining the three categories to produce one variable of organization
membership~

This may result in some distortion of the variable because

passive membership in a professional organization, for example, is
obviously quite different from active participation in a civic organization.
The respondents belong to an average of five voluntary organizations each.

The faculty group belongs to an average of six organiza-

tions; the county official group to three.

On the average, then, faculty

respondents belong to 50 per cent more organizations than county officials.
The average age of the respondents is 47 years.

57Droba, Op. Cit., pp. 96-111.

Both the faculty
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and county official group have approximately 11 years of experience
either as teachers or as county officials.
The mean IN score of the faculty is 34. Z, compared with the
county officials' mean IN of 45.5.

This indicates that the faculty group

is considerably less nationalist than the county official group.

The stan-

dard deviation of the two groups i.s approximately the same.
The mean MP score for the two groups is nearly the same. The
faculty mean is 56.

The county official mean is 54. Z.

This suggests

that the tendency toward militarism or pacifism is independent of different elite group membership.
The mean IL score of the county officials is higher than that of
the faculty.

Initially, this would indicate that the county officials, on

the whole, are more informed than the faculty.
is 40. 4; the county official, 41. Z.

The faculty mean score

Examination of the standard devia-

tions, however, illustrates that as a group, the faculty is more consistently well-informed than the county officials.
the faculty is 8.4; the county official, 63. 9.

The standard deviation of

These standard deviations

would produce the following curves if distribution were normal:
Figure 4
Distribution Curves of Faculty and County Official
Groups for Information Level (Normality assumed)

0

70
S.D. = 8.4
Mean = 40. 4
Faculty

70

0

S.D. = 63.4
Mean=41.Z
County Officials
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If all of the individuals studied are under the curves drawn in

Figure 4, then it is apparent that most of the faculty members are clustered in the middle near the mean; that is, they all scored about the
same on the scale.

For the county officials, however, the relatively

flat curve demonstrates that a sizeable number of county officials are
highly informed, and a sizeable number have virtually no information.
The implication of these two curves is that the faculty is more
consistently informed as a group than the county officials.

Approximately

60 per cent of the faculty scored within 8 point·s of the mean.

The county.

officials; on the other hand, more consistently varied from the mean
score.;

The Dependent Variables

Each dependent variable was matched with every other dependent
variable produ.cing a total of nine possible relationships.

With the ex-

ception of two relationships, the variables indicated nearly complete
independence from each other.
and IN variables.

This is especially important for the MP

Essentiallyp this independence reconfirms the propo-

sition that militarism-pacificism and nationalism-internationalism are
separate and distinct attitudes.

On the basis of the scales used in this

study, four categories of individuals may be established depending on·
their MP and IN scores: (1) militarist-nationalists; (Z) pacifistnationalists; (3) militarist-internationalists; (4) pacifist-internationalists.
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Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the distribution of the faculty and county
officials over the two scales.

The intersection of the axes is the hypoth-

etical median of the two scales.

Figure 5
Distribution of ·Faculty Sample Over
Nationalism-Internationalism and Militarism-Pacificism Scales
Pacifist
122

I

II

General distribution
0 ~~--------------..\.-----~~+---t------..ia..w..a.._....______~---

Internationalist

70

Nationalist

III:

IV
0

Militarist

Figure 6
Distribution of County Officials Sample Over
Nationalism-Internationalism and Militarism-Pacificism Scales
Pacifist
122

I
II
General area of
0 ~~--d~is_t_r~i_b_u_t_i~o.n________________-f-------~-1---------------~-----70
Internationalist
Nationalist

III

IV
0
Militarist
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This type of analysis permits a more precise description of groups
of individuals.

Quadrant I includes group with internationalist-pacifist

attitudes; quadrant 11, nationalist-pacifist: quadrant Ill, internationalistmilitarist: quadrant IV, nationalist-militarist.

Evidence in this study .

. indicates that the nationalist-internationalist dimension is highly dependent on demographic factors.

The militarist-pacificist di.mension, on

the other hand, is somewhat independent of demographic factors.

McClosky' s

study of the psychological determinants of foreign affairs dispositions
indicates that this dimension may be dependent on complex psychological
factors. 58
Table 1 indicates a significant relationship between militarismpacificism and nationalism-internationalism among county officials.
For this group only, there is a slight tendency for nationalists to be
also militarist and internationalists to be also pacifist.

This more closely

coincides with the common stereotypes of nationalists and internationalists.

The relationship does not obtain for either the faculty group or

the aggregate, however.
Level of information is independent of militarism-pacificism
and nationalism-internationalism except in one instance.

Table 2 in-

dicates a slight tendency in the aggregate toward high information levels
being characteristic of internationalists, and low information levels
being characteristic of nationalists.

58 McClosky,

The relationship is not significant

Op. Cit., pp. 77-78.
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when the two groups are tested separately.

The existence of a signifi,-

cant relationship in the aggregate, however, indicates that. further relationships might obtain if the scales and the test were to have more
discriminatory powers.

For example, in a larger sample the use of

interval scales and linear correlation might establish a stronger relationship.

TABLE 1
Militarism-Pacificism and Nationalism-Internationalism
Among County Officials
(Table Percentages)
Militarism

Pacifism

Nationalism

10.3

s. 1

Internationalism

41.

43.6
Chi Square 4. 9
P ( .05

TABLE 2
Nationalism-Internationalism and
Level of Information
(Both Groups- -Percentages)

.Level of
Information

Nationalism

Internationalism

High

10. 1

22.8

Low

38.0

29.l
Chi Square = 14. 6
P{ .05 . ·
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Analysis of the Independent Variables

Sex, Marital Status, and Age

No significant relationships exist between the dependent vari- .
ables and sex or marital status.

Slight tendencies toward significance

in a few instances are discounted because of the low number of females
and the low number of unmarried respondents.

Relationships with ini-

tially low frequencies in the independent variables must be viewed conservatively.

Unless the relationship is well into the significance range

its validity is highly questionable.
Age is a significant factor in the aggregate and the county official group.

Table 3 indicates a tendency of nationalists to be above the

mean age for both groups and internationalists to be below the mean age.

TABLE 3
Nationalism-Internationalism and Age
(Both Groups--Percentages}
Nationalism

Internationalism

Above Mean

33~7

22.5

Below Mean

15.

28.7

Age

Chi Square = 5. 2
P ( .05
Table 4 shows that the relationship is even stronger among county
officials.

In general, younger members of the group tend to be interna-

tionalist, older members tend to be nationalists.

For the county official

-----~---
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group. the relationship is one significance level stronger: in the aggregate p is less than • 05; in the county official group p is less than • 01. 5 9

TABLE 4
Nationalism-Internationalism and
Age of County Officials
(Percentages)
Nationalism

Internationalism

Above Mean

32.5

12.5

Below Mean

17.5

37.5

Age
Chi Square

= 6. 5

p(. 01
No relationship obtained for the faculty group when age was tested.
This would tend to indicate that if increasing age is coincident with a
certain attitudinal myopia. the effects are more pronounced in groups
which are less mobile and less educat_ed on the average.

Also. older

individuals whose attitude structures were formed soon after the United
States' experience in World War I and during the Depression of the 1930' s
are likely to reflect these experiences in their increased nationalism.
Again. tests with more discriminatory power, such as linear correlation, might discern more precise trends.
In no case is age found to be a significant determinant of militarismpacificism or level of information.

5 9see Chapter
ployed in this study.

v:,

for a description of the significa11;ce levels em-
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Level of Interest, Television Viewing,
Newspaper Reading, and Occupation

Respondents were placed into a high interest level group if they
indicated that they were "very interested in foreign affairs" or "moderately interested".

Responses of "interested, but not informed," or

"not at all interested" were categorized as low interest levels.

Tests

yielded two significant relationships: (1) Information level and level
of interest for the aggregate; (2) Nationalism-internationalism and level
of information for county officials.
Table 5 indicates an inverse relationship between information
level and level of interest for the 'aggregate.

As level of interest de-

clines, information level incr.eases.

TABLE 5
Information Level and Level of Interest
(Both Groups- -Percentages)

Information Level
High

Low

High

7.6

31. 6

Low

25.3

35.4

Interest
Chi Square • 4. 2
p ( • 05
The relationship does not exist when the aggregate is broken
down into faculty and county official groups.

The explanation of this

somewhat curious relationship, which was unexpected, is that level of
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interest is a self-evaluation variable.

The data indicates that the fac-

ulty group consistently under-estimated their level of interest vis-a-vis
their level of information.

On the other hand, the county officials con-

sistently over-estimated their level of interest vis-a-vis their score on
the level of information sea le.
The problem is not only one of proper self-evaluation.

Respond-

ents in each group appear to be comparing their level of interest to that
of their peers.

A biology instructor is not likely to be as diligent a

reader in international affairs as a political science instructor.
quently, he rates himself as "interested, but not informed~'.

Conse-

A county

official, however, whose absolute level of interest is lower than the
biology instructor's may well rate himself as moderately interested.
Re lati've to his peers, the county official is moderately interested.

With

this problem in mind, the value of some objective means of measuring
level of interest should be apparent.
Table 6 indicates, that among county officials, higher levels of
interest are more likely to be expressed by internationalis~s than nationalists.

To the extent that their self-evaluations are accurate, this rela-

tionship is somewhat circular.

Less interested individuals will tend to

select the information to which they are exposed.

As they are exposed

to less information about international affairs, the focus of their interest
narrows to nationalist concerns:.
Although the relationship between nationalism-internationalism
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and level of interest is in the second significance level for the county
official group, it is not significant in either the aggregate or the faculty
group.

Again, the major difficulty in dealing with this variable is that

it is self-evaluative.

TABLE 6
Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Interest
(County Officials- -Percentages)

Level of
Interest

Nationalism

Internationalism

High

12.5

30

Low

37.5

20
Chi Square • 5. 0
p ( . 01

Level of interest is not significantly related to militarismpacificism in any group.
The two variables, reading newspapers and watching television
are, in a sense, self-evaluative.

Then too, the questions used to mea-

sure these factors were not refined enough to discriminate between those
who followed international affairs and those who did not.

No significant

relationships were found between television viewing and any of the dependent variables.

One reason for this is that 82. 5 per cent of the respondents

indicated that they watch television news regularly.

This means that

without more questions tapping levels of viewing and kinds of programs
watched, it is nearly impossible to explain the role of this variable (given
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the small size of the sample and the characteristics of the c;hi square
test, also).
Consistent newspaper reading is significant in one instance:

Even

though approximately 70 per cent of the county officials indicated that
they consistently read newspapers.

Those who claim consistent reading•

habits are more likely to be internationalist than those who do not.
Those reporting that they do not consistently read newspapers are more
likely to be nationalist (see Table 7).

TABLE 7
Nationa lism-lnternationalism and
Consistent Newspaper Reading
(Both Groups- -Percentages)
Nationalism
Read

35

Do not Read

l'J. 7

Internationalism

47.5
3.7
Chi Square = 6. 0
p < . 05

Although the relationship is moderately significant for the county
o!ficial groups, it is not significant for the aggregate or the faculty group.
A gain, the variable would be more valuable if the questionnaire had probed

deeper:

local newspaper reading, for example, could have been distin-

guished from metropolitan newspaper reading.

News magazine reading

could have been measured separately.
The imprecision of the variable is evident in the lack of correla-
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tion between consistent newspaper reading and level of information •
. Most of the statements in the level of information scale are taken from
newspapers.
No analysis has been made of the occupation responses of the
county officials.

The wide range of occupations would have created so

many categories that, given the sample size, small numbers in the cells
would have made statistical analysis invalid.

For the same reason, the

faculty group was not divided into disciplines or schools.

The size and

characteristics of the sample meant that even mean scores of the dependent variables would be of questionable accuracy.

Natives of Illinois
Tables 8 and 9 show a relationship between natives of Illinois
and level of information and nationalism-int~rnationalism in the aggre_gate.

There is a tendency for nati':"es of Illinois to be slightly less in-

formed than non-natives.

Also, natives tend to be· nationalist, whereas

non-natives tend to be internationalist.

Both relationships are of a sec-

ond level of significance where p is less than • 01.

TABLE 8
Info.rmation Level and Natives of Illinois
(Both Groups- -Percentages)
Information Level
High

Low

Natives

15.Z

50.6

Non-natives

17.7

16.S
Chi Square • 6. 7
p ( .01
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TABLE 9
Nationalism-Internationalism and Natives of Illinois
(Both Groups- -Percentages)
Nationalism
Natives
Non-natives

Internationalism

40.0

Z6.Z

8.7

zs.-o
Chi Square • 8. 4
p (. 01

At first glance, the data seem to indicate that more highly mobile persons tend to be better informed and r,nore internationalist than
less mobile individuals.
two factors.
ship.

The finding must be qualified, however, by

To some extent, mobility parallels elite group member-

App!oximately 94 per cent of the county officials a.re natives of

Illinois.

Only 37. S per cent. of the faculty group are natives.

This means

that level of education and elite group membership are factors in the determination of the relationships between :attitudes and mobility (Tables
8 and 9).

Organization Membership
The results in Table 10 are slightly below the first order of significance established for this study.

A chi square of 3. Z when p is less

than. 10, however, is close enough to the first order of significance to
warrant its inclusion.

In the aggregate there is a slight tendency of

nationalism to be coincident with relatively low organization membership and internationalism with relatively high organization membership.
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The trend is slight, however, especially since the organization membership variable is a combined variabl~ ( see Chapter V).

TABLE 10
Nationalism-Internationalism and Organization Membership
·
(Both Groups- -Percentages)

Nationalism
Organization
Membership

Internationalism

High

18.8

30.0

Low

30.0

21. Z

Chi Square = 3. Z
p ( • 10
There is no significant relationship between organizational membership and militarism-pacificism or level of information.

Further,

the relationship between organization membership and nationalisminternationalism is not significant when.the aggregate was divided into
faculty and county official groups.

Party Affiliation
McClosky' s study of Democratic and Republican leaders and followers in a nation-wide survey suggests a possible relationship between
isolationism and party affiliation.

Although McClosky' s isolationism scale

is s.omewhat different, and his sample is significantly different, his find. ings are persuasive enough to warrant testing by this study.

McClosky

finds a distinct· tendency for Republicans to be more isolationist than
Democrats, especially among the party leadership.

The relationship
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is even stronger when level of education is a controlling factor. 60
The results in Table 11 reinforce McClosky' s findings.

At a

second, order of significance, Democrats are more likely to be internationalist; Republicans tend to be nationalist.

TA,BLE 11
Nationalism-Internationalism and Party Affiliation
(Both Groups--Row Percentages)
Nationalist
100%

Internationalist
0

100%

Democratic (N=40)
Republican (N= 34)
Independent (N•6)
Chi Square = 7. 0
p ( . 01
The relationship in Table 11 does not obtain for the county official group which was divided evenly among nationalists and internationalists.

As Table 12 illustrates, however, there is a second order of

significance relationship among the faculty group.

This may indicate a

greater amount of ideological elaboration and consistency among the
faculty than among the county officials.

At higher levels of education,

members of intellectual elites may tend to engage in more cognitive explorations of the implications of their respective party affiliations.

60McClosky,

Op.

£!!.,

p. 82.
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TABLE 12
Nationalism-Internationalism and
Party Affiliation Among Faculty
(Row Percentages)
Internationalism

Nationalism

1OOo/o

0

1 OOo/o
Democratic (N= 18) ·
Republican (N•l6)
Independent (N•6)

Chi Square = 4. S
p < •01
Party affiliation is the independent variable which had the most
significant relationship with militarism-pacificism.

Table 13 indicates

a first order of significance relationship between party affiliation and
militarism-pacificism.

Democrats are more likely to be relatively

pacifist, while Republicans are more likely to be militarist oriented.

TABLE 13
Militarism-Pacificism and Party Affiliation
. (Both Groups--Ro~ Percentages)
Militarist
100%

Pacifist
100%

0

Democratic (N=39)
Republican (N= 34)
Independent {N•6)
Chi Square • S. 7
p
OS

<.
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As in the relationship of party affiliation to nationalism-internationa lism, the relationship obtains for the faculty group, but not as
significantly for the county official group.

Table 14 shows that the re-

lationship is stronger when elite· group membership is a controlled factor.

It is important to note that 10, 3 per cent of the independents were

pacifist.

The relationship among the faculty is highly significant.

This

third order relationship is especially important in view of the fact that
no other independent variable in this study correlates as closely with
militarism-pacificism.

The general trend is present in the county offi-

cial group, but is less significant.
The display of Tables 11 through 14 with bars representing row
percentages aids visual comparison of the amount of overlap among the
groups.

This. is especially helpful when presenting 3x2 tables.

features become apparent in this arrangement.

Several

In Table 11, for exam-

ple, the chi square result is stJ,ongly affected by the occurance of 100
per cent of independents in the internationalist category.

The consider-

able amount of overlap between the Democrats and Republicans indicates
that the relationship is not as significant for the two parties.
Table 14 illustrates a more convincing statistical distribution.
There is little overlap between Democrats and Republicans, suggesting
that the relationship obtains for the two major parties in the faculty
group.

The large amount of overlap in the county official group and

the low chi square demonstrate a situation in which there is very little

TABLE 14
Militarism-Pacifici.sm and Party Affiliation
Among Faculty and County Officials
(Row Percentages)

Faculty

County Officials
Pacifist

Militarist

_
100%_______ 0 _______
100%
_.;...

_,_

Militarist

100%

Democratic (N• 17)

(N•22)

Republican (N= 16)

(N• 18)

Independent (N•6)

(N•O)

Chi Square • 12. 4
p ( . 001

Pacifist
0

100%

Chi Square • 1. 0
p(. 50
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relationship bet.ween the variables.

Level of Education, Social Science Gour se
Background, and Elite Group Membership
The independent variables in this section are directly related
to the validation of the hypotheses advanced in Chapter III.

Information

collected about the preceding independent variables provides valuable
background for the testing of the hypotheses, but is only indirectly related to them.
Table 15 provides strong support for the hypothesis that more
highly educated individuals are more likely to be highly informed.
chi square of the relationship is 10. 3 where p is less than . 01.

The

This

is a second order of significance according to the criteria of this study.
Close examination of Table 15 indicates that the impact of level
of education on level of information is especially ncticeable among low
levels of education.

The highly educated are more evenly divided be-

tween high and low information levels.

In low levels of education, how-

ever, there is a strong tendency for these individuals to also exhibit
low information levels.

For the aggregate, therefore, it can be said

that there is strong support for the hypothesis that level of information
varies positively with level of education.
Almond has reported that:
On questions involving knowledge of facts affecting
foreign policy it was found that the college-educated
contained four or five times as many informed persons as the grade school sample. 61

61 Almond, Op. Cit., p. 127.
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TABLE 15
Information Level and Level of Education
(Both Groups- -Percentages)

Information Level
High
High
30.4
Level of E d u c a t i o n - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Low
2.. s

Low
38.0
2.9. 1

Chi Square = 10. 3
p(. 01
The inclusion of high school level respondents in Table 1 S undoubtedly tends. to make the results of this study less striking than Almond's.
The level of significance .obtained, however, confirms Almond's initial

..

findings.

~

When the aggregate is divided into faculty and county official
groups, the relationship between level of education and level of information is not as significant.

Table 16 indicates a general trend toward

the relationship established by Table 15.
In an effort to discover whether the distinction between high and
low education might affect the results, the data were retested.

For the

faculty group the high level of education cut-off became the Ph.D. level
instead of the M.A. level.
the new cut ... off point.

For the county officials, high school became

No significant changes in the strength of the rela-

tionships occu;red as a result of these attempts.
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TABLE16
Information Level and Level of Education
Among Faculty and County Officials
(Percentages)
:===============
Information Level
County Official

Faculty
High

Low

High

Low

High

62.5

2 7. 5

10.3

25.6

Low

2.5

7.5

5. 1

59.0

Level of Education

Chi Square = 3. 1
p ( . 10

Chi Square • Z. 9
p (. 10

Two significant inferences are drawn from the analysis of Tables
15 and 16.

First, the largest differences in level of information appear

to be the result of some college exposure, that is, undergraduate study.
Evidently, an increased inclination to be informed about international
affairs tapers off after some college work.

The differences between

the levels of information among individuals with Ph.D. degrees and
those with B,.A., degrees is not highly significant.

Similarly, the di£-

ference between individuals with grade school education and those with
high school education is of a lower order of significance.
Secondly, these tables indicate that elite group membership is
a significant factor in the determination of level of information.

In the

aggregate, the differences between low levels of education and high levels
of information are the greatest.

Approximately ZO per cent of the county
~I

73·

officials had completed some college study, whereas 100 per cent of
.the faculty were in the high level of education category.

To some ex-

tent, then, this would imply a relationship between elite group membership and level of information.
detail later i·n tho study.

This tendency will be discussed in more

At this point it is sufficiont to noto that intra-

group differences in levels of information are significantly less than
differences among the aggregate.
The test illustrated by Table 17 yields a third order of significance relationship between level of education and nationalism-internationalism.

For the aggregate, the chi square is 15. 8 where p is less

than. 001.

Under these conditions, the proposition that individuals of

high levels of education are more likely to be internationalists is validated.

Also, individuals of low levels of education are more likely to

be nationalist.

TABLE 17
Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Education
(Both Groups- -Percentages)
Nationalism

Internationalism

High

22.5

45.0

Low

26.Z

6.3

Level of Education
Chi Square• 15.8
p ( • 001
It is important to note that only 6. 3 per cent of the respondents
are internationalists with low levels of education.

The lower right cell
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of Table 1 7 contains the smallest percentage of respondents in the table.
This information quite clearly confirms the hypothesis that increased
levels of education are positively related to increased internationalism.
The relationship does not appear as strong when the groups are
tested separately, however.

Table 18 illustrates that a trend toward

this relationship exists among county officials, but not among faculty.
For the county officials, the hypothesis is strongly supported with a chi
square of 4. 0 where p is less than . 01.

TABLE 18
Nationalism-Internationalism and Level of Education
Among Faculty and County Officials

Nationalism-Internationalism
Faculty (N

=

40)

Nationalist Internationalist
High
Level of
Education Low

County Official (N • 40)
Nationalist Internationalist

42.5

47.5

10

25

5

5

40

25

Chi Square = .01
p (. 90

Chi Square • .4. 0
p ( . 01

Among the county officials, internationalists are equally divided
into high and low education levels.

The nationalists in this group, how-

ever, were much more likely to exhibit low education levels.
In the faculty group, both the high and low education levels were
almost equally divided into nationalists and internationalists.

From

Table 18 it is evident that the faculty group is preponderently in the
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high level of education category.

The low frequencies in the low level

of education category prompted a resort of the data along the lines de .. ·
scribed previously under the level of information variable.

No sJgnifi-

cant change in the chi square of the test resulted after re-establishing
cut-off points.
As mentioned before, this lack of a high level of significance
among the faculty group may indicate that increased tendencies toward
internationalism taper off after initial exposure to college education.
Because the differences noted in the aggregate are more significant than
when elite group membership is controlled for, this implies that group
membership has an impact on nationalism-internationalism.
In an effort to discern the impact of social science courses on
level of information, the test illustrated by Table 19 was performed.
The test produced a chi square of 19. 3 where p is less than . 001.
is well over a third order of significance.

This

The hypothesis that individuals

with relatively high levels of social science course background are more
likely to be well informed is validated.

The relationship is especially

evident at low levels of social science background.

Only 5. 1 per cent

of respondents exhibited low social science background and high levels
of information in the aggregate.

On the other hand, 45. 6 per cent of

respondents from low social science backgrounds were in the low information level category.

Among respondents from high social science ,,

backgrounds, the difference between high and low information levels
is not as large.
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TABLE 19
Information Level and Social Science Course Background
(Both Groups- -Percentages)

Information Level

Social Science
Background

High

Low

High

27.8

21. 5

Low

5 •. 1

45.6
Chi Square = 19. 3
p ( . 001

The same trend is present when the aggregate is divided into
the two elite groups.

As in previous tests, the significance in the fac-

ulty group is much lower than either the aggregate or the county official group.

The faculty group yielded a chi square of I. 0, but the

county official group produced a chi square of 4. 3.

Because the ques-

tionnaire did not distinguish between types of social science courses,
it is impossible to determine whether there is an actual quantitative limit
where social science courses cease contributing to increased levels of
information or whether the specific subject area of courses influences
levels of information.

In the aggregate, however, the positive influence

of social science course background on internationalism is evident.
The results presented in Table 2 0 support the hypothesis that individuals from high levels of social science background are more likely
to be internationalist.

For the aggregate, the test obtained a chi square

of 12.9 where pis less than .001.

,---
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TABLE 20
Nationalism-Internationalism and Social Science Course Background
(Both Groups--Percentages)

=======================-==-=-=======-=====

=======-c:or:=-==============---==-

Nationalism
Social Science
Course Background

Internationalism

High.

13.7

35.0

Low

35.0

16 •. 2
Chi Square = 12. 9
p ( . 001

Within the two elite groups the positive relationship between social science background and internationalism is less s1.gnificant.

A chi

square of 4. 3 where pis less than. 01 was obtained from the county official group.

In this case, the hypothesis is strongly supported.

Pos,-

sibly because the questionnaire does not have sufficient discriminatory
powers at very high levels of social science course background, no significance was determined from the faculty group.

Again, it is worth-

. while mentioning that internationalism may increase up to a certain level
of social science course background and then stabilize at a given level.
Also, types of courses may be important in determining the impact'. of
this variable on internationalism.
The results presented in Table 21 provide strong support for the
hypothesis that level of information is dependent on specific elite group
membership.

It.

chi square of 10. 7 where· pis less than. 01 establishes

a second order of significance for this relationship. 62 Faculty mem62 A chi square of 10. 7 is • 1 away from a third order relationship.
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bers were evenly divided into high and low level respondents.

The county

officials, however, were much more likely to be in the low level of information category.

Approximately 84 per cent of the county officials

scored below the aggregate mean on the level of information scale.

TABLE 21
Information Level and ~lite Group Membership
(Both Groups--Percentages)

Information Level

Faculty
County Officials

High

Low

25.3

25.3

7.6

41. 8
Chi Square = IO. 7
p( .0I

Evidence presented earlier in this chapter demonstrated that the
mean score of the county official group on the IL scale was slightly higher
than the faculty mean score.

It was also noted that the standard devi-

ation of the county official group was much larger than that of the faculty group.

Combined with Table 21, this indicates that the few county

officials who scored above the mean on the IL scale scored very high.
The remainder either scored on or closely below the mean.

The dis-

'

tribution of the faculty group around the mean appears more "normal",
although the curve is rather steeply sloped.
Table 22 illustrates the relationship which is the most significant of all those that were tested in this study.

This test yielded a chi
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square of 22. 0 where pis less than . 001.

The hypothesis that nationalism-

internationalism is dependent on specific elite group membership is
validated.

The faculty group consistently tended to be more internation-

alist than the county official group.

The county official group were con-

sistently more nationalist than the faculty group.

On the basis of the

information in this study, elite group memberships appear to be the
single most important factor in the determination of nationalism-internationalism.

TABLE 22
Nationalism-Internationali~m and Elite Group Membership
(Both Groups- -Percentages)

Nationalism

Internationalism

Faculty

11. 2

38.7

County Official

37.5

12.5
Chi Square = 22. 0
p (.001

This striking relationship is the result of the combination of a
number of factors.

High levels of mobility, education, social science

course background, and organization membership, all of which are more
or less associated with internationalism, are exhibited by the faculty
group.

Similarly, low levels of these variables, which are associated

with nationalism, are apparent in the county official group.

The com-

bination of these factors, however, falls short of totally explaining the
very strong relationship between elite group membership and nationalism-
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internationalism.

Clearly, elite group membership in itself is an add-

itional and important variable in the determination of nationalist or
internationalist attitudes.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This paper offers support for the contention that demographic
variables .are significant determinants of political attitudes.

Experi-

ence gained in this study also provides the basis for suggestions for
further research in this area, especially in view of the following conclusions.
The significant relationship between high levels of formal education and internationalist dispositions is an important finding for foreign
policy decision-making analysis.

For instance, one might speculate

that as the average level of education in a nation increases, the more
difficult it would become for leadership to gain public acceptance of
strictly nationalist-oriented foreign policies.

In this circumstance,

increasingly internationalist foreign policies would coincide more closely
with existing attitudes,
The results in this study indicate that a more highly educated
electorate is also likely to be better informed about foreign affairs.
Generally high levels of information among the electorate in a democracy might result in more careful scrutiny of proposed foreign policies.
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This would tend to make policy makers responsible for more extensive
and open justification

of their proposals and actions.

Considered with the other findings, the strong relationship between elite group membership and foreign affairs dispositions carries
important implications.

To some extent, foreign policy is formulated

in the context of the values and attitudes of the electorate.

This study

indicates that at least some of the attitudes are determined by factors
which are beyond the immediate control of any one administration.
Furthermore, the large number and variety of elite groups in the United
States indicates the difficulties that leaders encounter when attempting
to formulate a consensus of opinion on a particular foreign policy is sue.
This not only underscores the complexity of a President's task of
opinion leading, but also may indicate the extent to which an administration is limited in the range of foreign policy alternatives that it may
adopt.

The illustration that foreign affairs dispositions are at least par-

tially determined by demographic variables therefore implies that the
task of a foreign policy decision-maker is to opt for the policy which
most closely coincides with the dispositions of most of the electorate,..
This is somewhat analogous to the mathematical problem of calculating the position of a straight line through a field of points so that
the line is as close as possible to every point.

The decision-maker's

problem is ~onsiderably more complex because he has more "points"
to deal with, and they may be slowly moving as he attempts his calculation.,
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0{ course, a good number of alternative policies are precluded
by the strategies of the particular international situation.

Also, the

possibility of secret foreign policy moves means that the dispositions
of the electorate· are not necessarily equally relevant in all situations.
It should be noted that these findings do not deny a President's
ability to form and lead public opinion on foreign policy.

The decision

to emphasize one issue instead of another, for example, no doubt molds
opinion to some extent.

These findings, however, indicate that an admin-

istration operates within definable parameters of public disposition that
it can violate only at a risk to its acceptability to the electorate.

The

parameters may shift gradually as level of education and group membership change, but it is probably safe to propose that their control is
beyond the capability of even a two-term administration.
Better substantiation of these conclusions would involve research
in the area of public opinion-foreign policy linkages.

Research in this

area would attempt to discover a relationship between public opinion
content and foreign policy content over a specific period of time.

Further

research at the level of analysis employed by this study, however, might
use several refinements in technique.

More extensive and more precise

survey research would allow one to advance the previous conclusions with
fewer qualifications and greater certainty.
Two variables, social science course background and organization membership, illustrate one of the most significant problems for
this study.

In both cases, the causal flow of the relationship might run
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in the opposite direction.

.

Specifically, it may be the case that indivi-

duals of internationalist disposition tend to enroll in more social science
courses and join more voluntary organizations.

Also, the flow may run

in both directions, where the attitude encourages the activity, and the
activity

reinforces the attitude.
More extensive studies of parent-child samples and pre-college·

followed by post-college tests would contribute to a better understanding
of these relationships.

:Research designed to establish the relationship

between nationalism-internationalism and other political and social attitude s might short cut this problem somewhat.

Although the existence

and direction of a cause-effect relationship is debatable, the significance
of the relationships illustrates that the variables are useful indicators
of existing attitudes.
The factor separating truly useful indicators from merely interesting ones is the conceptual and operational precision of the measuring
instrument.

It may be noted without embarrassment that the instruments

and scales employed in this study could be refined considerably.

For

instance, if all scales had been interval, linear regression analysis
would have been possible.

This would have added a degree of statistical

precision to th~ final product.

Even though the scales had been exten-

sively pre-tested, t!1ey could have been changed in some cases to good
advantage.

Larger samples would yield more reliable results.

The list

of possible improvements and modifications is perhaps endless.
One of the purposes of this study, however, was to determine
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whether these specific sets of variables merit further and more sophisticated investigation,

The existence of highly significant relationships

at this level of sophistication justifies the use of more refined methods
and more extensive procedures for further re search in this area,

APPENDIX A
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The survey that you have been asked to participate in is being
done in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters Degree at
Eastern Illinois University. The results of your questionnaire wi 11 be
kept comp lctc ly confidentia 1. Eventually the information from over one
hundred such questionnaires will·be compiled ·for academic purposes.
This study will not express any individual's opinion, but rather considers
op1n1ons of groups of people: For instance, older people's versus younger
people's opinions, and men's versus women's opinions,
In its completed form, this study will be on file in Booth Library
at Eastern Illinois University as of December 1, 19 71. If you wish, you
may read the results in Booth after that date.
You have been selected by techniques which make it important
that you in particular respond to the questionnaire. Your cooperation
is invaluable and will be greatly appreciated.
Thank You,

Char le s R . Burns
Graduate Student
Department of Political Science
Eastern Illinois University

FOREIGN AFFAIRS SURVEY
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
SUMMER 1971
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INSTRUCTIONS TO INTERVIEWERS
1.

Your directions on the questionnaire a re enclosed in boxes. During
. an interview read the entire questionnaire word for word, except
those directions enclosed in boxes.

2.

Read the statements slowly and clearly. I£ the respondent does not
understand a statement or some instruction, reread the statement
or instruction without changing a word.

3.

Be certain that the cards us.ed by the respondent are returned to
you immediately.

4.

Get a response for each question and fill in each blank on the answer
sheet with a pen.

S.

Mark each block plainly; write the occupation and academic discipline response legibly.

6.

Don't forget to enter the case number and your number on the answer
sheet.

7.

If you have any problems; in the event that anyone questions your
credentials, call the Political Science Department.

8.

Smile.
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS QUESTIONNAIRE
EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
SUMMER 1971
INTRODUCTION:

HAND CARD:

HELLO ..• I'M AN INTERVIEWER FROM EASTERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY. THEY'RE DOING A STUDY
OF SOME OF THE OPINIONS THAT PEOPLE HAVE
ABOUT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.
THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS WITH WHICH
SOME PEOPLE AGREE AND OTHERS DISAGREE.
PLEASE TELL ME THE AMOUN·T OF YOUR AGREE MENT OR DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH ONE AFTER
I READ IT, BY USING THIS CARD.

I.

We need more leaders who have the morals and strength to put national honor above appeasement.

2.

If it weren't for Russia and her satellites, the world would be headed
for peace and prosperity by now.

*3.

In the long run, it would be to our be st interest as a nation to spend
less money for military purposes and more money for education,
housing and other social improvements.

4.

The immigration of foreigners to this country should be kept down
so that we can provide for Americans first.

5.

The only way peace can be maintained is to keep America so powerful and well armed that no other nation will dare attack us.

*6.

Our best policy in Viet Nam would be to forget about the Saigon government and work for an agreement with the Communists.

7.

If the United Nations doesn't show more signs of getting rough with
Russia soon, America must be prepared to carry on the fight by itself.

8.

While we should give military aid to countries which are prepared to
fight our enemies, we ought to cut down on foreign economic help, or
else the other countries will just play us for a sucker.

9.

In these troubled times, if we are to be strong and united against
our common enemy, we must have more laws and safeguards against
the spreading of dangerous ideas.

*10.

One main trouble with American foreign policy today is that there is
too much concern with military force and too little concern with political negotiation and economic reconstruction.
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11.

*12.

In view of America's material and moral superiority, it is only right
tha,t,we should have the biggest say in deciding United Nations policy.
The first principle of our foreign policy should be to join forces
with any country even if it is not very democratic, just as long as it
is strongly anti-Communist.

TAKE CARD BACK:
THE PURPOSE OF THE NEXT GROUP OF QUESTIONS IS TO MEASURE DIFFER ENC ES IN OPINIONS RELATING TO PEA CE AND WAR.
THE STATEMENTS EXPRESS VARIOUS DEGREES OF OPINION ABOUT
MILITARISM-PACIFISM.
AFTER I READ EACH STATEMENT, TELL IF, ON THE WHOLE
YOU AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT, OR IF, ON THE WHOLE YOU
DISAGREE WITH THE SENTIMENT OF THE STATEMENT. PLEASE
RESPOND TO EACH STATEMENT EVEN IF IT SEEMS AMBIGUOUS
AND YOU HAVE TO MAKE SOME SORT OF GUESS.
MARK A PLUS SIGN ON THE ANSWER' SHEET FOR AGREEMENT, AND
A MINUS SIGN TO INDICATE DISAGREEMENT.
13. Multitudes are benefited by learning the lesson of wartime discipline.
14. Army discipline injures self-respect and individuality.
15. It is the moral duty of the individual to refuse to participate in any
war, no matter what the cause.
16. For the liberty of oppressed nations wa~s should be fought.
l 7. It is impossible to have a large military force without being tempted
to use it.
18. So long as any people, white, black, brown or yellow hold weapons
in their hands, we must not commit the folly:of ·disarrning.
19. No scheme of aggression or conquest can be pursued for any considerable length of time without enfeebling victor as well as vanquished •.
20. There is no progress without war.
21. If armed conflict between individuals and cities can be outlawed, it
is possible to outlaw armed conflict between nations.
2.2.. Military training is imperative, but it should be voluntary.
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23. A host of young men entered the war in a spirit of idealism and unselfish devotion to a great cause, only to return disillusioned and
cynical as to the value of ideals.
24. Peace and war are both essential to progress.
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS CAN BE COMPLETED BY ONE
OF FOUR CHOICES THAT WILL BE READ AFTER EACH STATEMENT.
CHOOSE THE ONE THAT YOU THINK IS MOST CORRECT FOR EACH
STATEMENT, IF YOU HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO READ ABOUT OR HAVEN'T
HEARD ABOUT ONE OF THE STATEMENTS MAKE SOME SORT OF GUESS.
2S. The name of the current Secretary-General of the United Nations
is: A. Arthur Goldberg; B. David K. Bruce; C. U Thant; D.
William J. Fullbright.
26. The following country is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO): A. The United Kingdom; B. France; C.
Sweden; D. The United States.
2 7. The Warsaw Pact might be considered the East European equivalent
to: A. SEATO; B. NATO; C. The UN; D. EEC.

28. A recent move by President Nixon to improve United States' relations
with Red China has been: A. Breaking diplomatic relations with Nationalist China; B. Sending foreign aid to mainland China; C. Easing
some trade restrictions with mainland China; D. Sending an official
delegation to both mainland and Nationalist China.
29. The principal participants in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) a·re: A. The United States and France; B. France and The
Soviet Union; C. Germany and The Soviet Union; D. The United
States and The Soviet Union.
30. One of the main goals of United States foreign policy in the Middle
East has been: A. The return of the Golan Heights; B. Con.frontation with the Soviet Union whenever possible; C. Increasing the
stability of the current cease-fire situation;
D. Opening of the
Suez Canal under Israeli supervision.
31. The Alliance For Progress was the framework for a United States
foreign policy directed at countries in: A. South America; B. Africa;
C. Eastern Europe; D. Southeast Asia.
32. According to the "Domino Theory" of international relations, allowing
one country in Southeast Asia to become controlled by the Communists
would result in: A. Worldwide Communist takeover; B. Other
countrie,s thinking that the United States is weak; · C. Economic ruin.
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of the neighboring countries; D. Communist takeover in the n~h~oring countries.
33. One of the main obstacles to nuclear disarmament is: A. France's
refusal to sign the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; B. Failure to agree
on the terms of inspecti~; C. Continued underground nuclear testing by the Soviet Union; D. Repeated nuclear threats by Red China.
34. The chief delegate to the Paris Peace talks for the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) is: A. Le Dud Tho; B. Nguyen Cao Ky;
C. Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh; D. General Khan.
35. The General Assembly of the United Nations can act on a issue when
the Security Council is dead locked in a veto under the provisions of:
A. The Grand Alliance; B. The Essentials of Peace Resolution; C.
The Uniting for Peace Resolution; D. The Troika Plan.
36. The five nation Andean Pact is designed to: A. Limit foreign investment in South America; B. Provide for the common defense of South
American countries on both sides of the Andes; C. Establish a sort
of Common Market in South America; D. Impose economic hardships
on the United States by means of a limited boycott.
IN ORDER TO COMPLETE THIS STUDY, SOME INFORMATION ABOUT
YOU IS NECESSARY. PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
AS ACCURATELY AS POSSIBLE.
37. Do you consider yourself: A. Very interested in foreign affairs; B.
Moderately interested; C. Interested, but not informed; D. Not at
all interested?
38. Do you read newspapers regularly?
39. Do you listen to the news on the radio or television regularly?
40. Do you consider yourself a native of Illinois?
41. About how many professional organizations do you belong to?
42. A bout how many civic organizations do you belong to?
43·~ About how many fraternal organizations do you belong to?
44. What is your primary occupation:?
OBTAIN A DEFINITE ANSWER •. IF RESPONDENT IS A TEACHER, CONTINUE WITH QUESTION #45; IF NOT, PROCEED TO QUESTION #46.
...
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45. What is your academic discipline?
46. HAND RESPONDENT CARD #Z: Looking at this card just give me the
letter of the group which describes how much school you have completed.
IF RESPONSE IS "D" THRU "G" ASK QUESTION #47; IF NOT, PROCEED.
TO QUESTION #48.
47. About how many courses did you have in the social sciences?
48. In politics do you consider yourself a Democrat or a Republican, or
a member of some other party?
IF RESPONS~ IS "INDEPENDENT", ASK QUESTION #49; IF NOT, PROCEED
TO QUESTION #50.
49. Would you say that you lean more toward the Republican side or toward
the Democratic side?
IF RESPONSE IS STILL "INDEPENDENT", RECORD IT AS SUCH.
50. What is your age in years?· IF NO RESPONSE, ENTER AN ESTIMATE.
51. What is your marital status?
52. ENTER WHETHER RESPONDENT IS MALE OR FEMALE.
53. ENTER CASE NUMBER.
54. ENTER INTERVIEWER NUMBER.
55. IS RESPONDENT: A. A MEMBER OF EIU FACULTY; <B. COUNTY
OFFICIAL?

56. IF RESPONDENT IS A COUNTY OFFICIAL ASK: How many years
have you been an elected county official? · ·
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TELL THE INTERVIEWER THE AMOUNT OF YOUR AGREEMENT OR
DISAGREEMENT WITH EACH STATEMENT THAT HE READS BY CHOOSING THE NUMBER OPPOSITE THE PHRASE THAT BEST EXPRESSES
YOUR OPINION:

+I: Slightly support, agreement ·

-1: Slight opposition, disagree

+2: Moderate support, agreement

-2: Moderate opposition, disagree.

+3: Strong support, agreement

-3: Strong opposition, disagree

PLEASE RETURN THIS CARD TO THE INTERVIEWER

TELL THE INTERVIEWER THE LETTER OF THE GROUP WHICH DESCRIBES HOW MUCH SCHOOL YOU HAVE COMPLETED:
A.

0-8 years

B. Some High School

c.

Completed High School

D.

Some College

E.

Completed College

F. Graduate Degree (MA Level)
G.

Graduate Degree (Ph.D. Level)

PLEASE RETURN THIS CARD.: TO THE INTERVIEWER
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CHOOSE THE ANSWER THAT YOU THINK BEST COMPLETES THE
STATEMENT THAT IS READ BY THE INTERVIEWER:
2. 5. A. Arthur Goldberg; B. David K. Bruce; C. U Thant; D. William
J. Fullbright.
2.6. A. The United Kingdom; B. France; C. Sweden; D. The United
States.
2.7. A. SEATO; B. NATO; C. T,he UN; D. EEC.
2.8. A. Breaking diplomatic relations with Nationalist China; B. Sending
foreign aid to mainland China; C. Easing some trade restrictions
with mainland China; D. Sending an official delegation to both mainland and Nationalist China.
2.9. A. The United States and France; B. France and the Soviet Union;
C. Germany and the Soviet Union; D. The United States and the Soviet
Union.
30. A. The return of the Golan Heights; B. Confrontation with the Soviet
Union whenever possible; C. Increasing the stability of the current
cease-fire .situation; D. Opening of the Suez Canal under Israeli
supervision.
31. A. South America;
Asia.

B. Africa; C. Eastern Europe; D. Southeast

32.. A. Worldwide Communist takeover; B. Other countries thinking
that the United States is weak; C. Economic ruin of the neighboring
countries; D. Communist takeover in the neighboring countries.
33. A. France's refusal to sign the Nuclear. Test Ban Treaty; B. Failure
to agree on the terms of inspections; C. Continued underground·
nuclear testing by the Soviet Union; D. Repeated nuclear threats by
Red China.
34. A. Le.·nuc Tho; B. Nguyen Cao Ky; C. Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh;
D. General Khan.
35. A. The Grand Alliance; B. The Essentials of Peace Resolution; C. ·
The Uniting for Peace Resolution; D. The Troika Plan.
36. A. Limit foreigq. investment in South America; B. Provide for the
common defense of South American countries on both sides of the
Andes; C. Establish a sort of Common Market in South America;
D. Impose economic hardships on the United States by means of a
limited boycott.
PLEASE RETURN THIS LIS'Il.TO THE INTERVIEWER

97
ANSWER SHEET

+3

-t2.

+

-

+l

NR

-1

-2

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
2.4

5
15
21
6
13
4
13
0
14
7
15
9

NR

52
53
54
55
56
57

M

F

A

B'

-3

B
C
A
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
C
B
37 A
38 Yes
39 Yes
40 Yes
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
;I
48 D- R
R·.
I
D
49
50
M ··o.
51 $

D

D

-No
No
·No

:NR
NR

SP.

w

NR

CODE BOOK
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SURVEY
SUMMER 1971
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CODING INSTRUCTIONS63
If quantitative values are of fewer digits than available columns,
preface values with zeroes to fill all columns.

Procedure

Column Numbers
and Variables
Cl - C3

Add scores of numbers 1-12 using the following equivalent numbers:
+3
7
*l

. +-2 .

*Note:

6
2

+l

s:
3

NR
4
4

-1
3
5

-2
2
6

-3
1
7

Equivalency scale is reverse for starred
items.

Determine the mean value of the total score
and multiply by ten.
Enter result in Cl - C3.

SKIP C4
CS - C7

Add equivalent numbers in items 12-24 which
show a ch~ck in the plus (+) cqlumn.
Enter result in CS - C7.

SKIP

ca

C9 - Cll

Add five poi.'nts for each correct answer in
items 25-36.
Enter total in C9 - Cll.

SKIP Cl2

63 These procedures were developed to transfer the data to computer punch cards.
The procedures outlined were considerably simplified in actual
field work by the use of a relatively simple scoring key which fitted over
the answer sheet.
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CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)
Procedure

Column Numbers
and Variables

cn·

Enter checked value:
A = l; B • 2; C • 3; D • 4.

Cl4, Cl5, Cl6 .

Enter '·'l" £or Yes; "2" for No in C14, Cl5,
Cl6 respectively.

Cl7

Add values of items 41 - 43 and enter result
in Cl 7.
Note: If value is greater than "9", enter "9"
in Cl 7.

SKIP Cl8
Cl9 - 21

Consult occupation equivalencies and enter
equivalent numbers in Cl9 - CZl.

SKIP C22
C23
Academic Discipline

Consult any discipline equivalencies and enter
equivalent number in C23.

C24
Level of Education

Convert value in Item 46 by consulting Level
of Education Equivalencies and enter equivalent number in C24.

C25
Courses in Social
Sciences

Enter value in item 47 in CZS.
If value.is greater than "9", enter

If blank, enter

11

"9".

0 11 •

SKIP C26
C27
Party Affiliation

For items 48 - 49, enter the following value
in CZ7: D ... l; R • 2; I• 3; NR • 4.

SKIP C28
C29 - 31
Age.

Enter value of Item 50 in C2.9 - 31.
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CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)
Procedure

Column Numbers
and Variables
SKIP C32.
C33
Marital Status

For item 51 enter the following values in C33:
S

C34
Sex

= 1;

M • 2.; D = 3; Sp

= 4; W • 5; NR • 6.

For item 52. enter the following value in C34:
M = l; F = Z.
.

SKIP C35
C36. - C38'·
ca·se· Numbe,r· :· ·

' value in C36 - C38.
For item 53 enter

SKIP C39
C40 - C42.
Interviewer Number

For itemr54 '.ente~~value in C40 - C4Z.

SKIP C43
C44
Faculty or County
Officia 1 Group

For item 55 enter the following values:
A = l; B = 2..

SKIP G4S
C46 - G4S
Years of Teaching
Experience

For item 56 enter appearing values
If less than one year, enter "001".

For any part of a year, enter next highest year.

If blank, enter· "000" in C46 - C48.
SKIP C49

cso - csz

For item 57 enter appearing values.

Years in Public Office
If less than one year, enter ''001".

For ,any part of a year, enter

•mo 1".

If blank, enter "000" in CSO - CSZ.

1oz
CODING INSTRUCTIONS (Continued)
Column Numbers
and Variables
C54 - C58

Procedure

Enter "08071" (Date and Project Code) in
C54 - C58 for all cards.
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OCCUPATION EQUIVALENCIES64 CI9 - CZI

Occupation

Equivalency

001

Professional and technical.

002

Farmers and farm managers.

003

Man.agers, officials, and proprietors.

004

Clerical workers.

005

Sales workers.

006

Craftsmen and foremen.

007

Operatives.

008

Private household workers.

009

Service workers.

010

Farm laborers and foremen.

011

Laborers, except farm and mine.

012

Students.

013

Housewives.

014

Retired, Unemployed, and Widows.

64 Adapted from Backstrom· and Hursch, Qe_. Cit., pp. 99-101.
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DISCIPLINE EQUIVALENCIES CZ3

Equivalent
Number

Academic Discipline

1

College of Letters and Science.
Political Science; Sociology and Anthropology;
History; Economics; Physiology; Botany; Zoology;
Life Sciet1.ce; Physics; Chemistry; Geology and
Geography; Mathematics; Philosophy; Art; Theatre
Arts; Speech; Languages and Literature.

z

Faculty of Education

3

School of Business.
Accounting; Business Education and Secretarial
Studies; Management; Marketing; Graduate School
of Business.

4

School of Health, Physical Education and Recreation

5

School of Home Economics

6

School of Industrial Arts and Technology

7

School of Music

105
LEVEL OF EDUCATION EQUIVALENCIES C24

Equivalent
Number

Answer Sheet
Response

1

A

0 - 8 years

2

B

Some High School

3

C

Completed High School

4

D

Some College

5

E

Completed College

6

F

Graduate Degree (MA level)

7

G

Graduate Degree (Ph.D. level)

Level of Education

APPENDIX B

TABLE 23
Quantitative Characteristics of Elite Groups
And Aggregate Sample

Range

Mean

S.D.

S. E.

~regate
Nationalism-Internationalism
Militarism-Pacific ism
Information Level
Organization Membership
Age
Social Science Background

9.9
55.3
40.8
4.6
47. 1
3.8

10.9
20.5
45.3
3.3
12.3
3.6

1..2
2.3
5. 1
.4
1.4
.4

45
90
30
9
75
9

Faculty
Nationalism-Internationalism
Militarism-Pacific ism
Information Level
Organization Membership
Age
Social Science Background
Experience

34.2
56.0
40.4
5.9
42.6
6.5
11. 5

10.0
Z0.5
8.4
2.9
12.4
Z.7
8.0

1. 6
3.Z
1.· 3
•5

45
90
35
9
62
9
30

County Officials
· Nationalism-Internationali"sm
Militarism-Pacific ism
Information Level
Organization Membership
Age
Social Science Background
Experience

.45. 5
54.7
41. Z ·
3.3
1. z
51. 6
.11. 8

8.6
20. 8
63.9
3.0

1.4
3.3
10.1
•5

10.6
Z0.3

1.7
3.Z
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z.z

z.o

.4
1. 3

.4

37
84

70
9
9
42
ZS

Figure 7
Attitudinal Distribution of Faculty Over
Nationalism-Internationalism and
Militarism-Pacificism Scales

Pacifist: ··
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•
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Figure 8
Attitudinal Distribution of County Officials
Over Nationalism-Internationalism and
Militarism-Pacificism Scales
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